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ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY UNDER TITLE 
IX FOR GIRLS FROM MINORITY, URBAN, 
RURAL, AND ECONOMICALLY 
DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES 
KENNETH D. FERGUSON© 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to intersectionality theory, discriminatory influences effect 
decisions regarding allocations of scarce resources, whether political, financial, 
or athletic.1  I experienced an epiphany during a meeting of Faculty Athletic 
Representatives (FAR)2 and intercollegiate athletic personnel where Title IX3 
issues were discussed.  During the discussion, I mentioned that I noticed certain 
proposed National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) legislation 
contained a section captioned “Title IX impact.”  The response assumed that by 
balancing spending priorities in men’s football, men’s basketball, and track and 
field with appropriate allocations in women’s volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, crew, 
and water polo,4 both gender equity and “minority gender equity” would be 
 
  Associate Professor, UMKC School of Law; B.S., Drake University, 1975; J.D., O.W. Coburn 
Law School at Oral Roberts University, 1986.  This Article was possible because of a Research Grant 
by UMKC Law School.  I thank my colleagues Daniel Weddle, for allowing me to introduce the ideas 
for this Article to his Constitutional Law course, and to William Session, J.D., for listening to my late 
night arguments.  Thanks also to my Research Assistant, Ben Friesen. 
1. See LOUIS KUSHNICK, RACE, CLASS & STRUGGLE: ESSAYS ON RACISM AND INEQUALITY IN 
BRITAIN, THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE 46–47 (1998). 
2. A FAR is defined by the FAR Association as, 
a member of the faculty at an NCAA member institution.  He or she has been designated by the institution 
to serve as a liaison between the institution and the athletics department, and also as a representative of the 
institution in conference and NCAA affairs. . . . 
. . . [T]he role of the FAR is “ . . . to ensure that the academic institution establishes and maintains the 
appropriate balance between academics and intercollegiate athletics.” 
About FARs, FARA, http://farawebsite.org/welcome-to-farawebsite-org/about-fara/about-fars/ (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2014) (quoting FARA, CONSTITUTION OF FACULTY ATHLETICS REPRESENTATIVES 
ASSOCIATION (2012), available at http://farawebsite.org/welcome-to-farawebsite-org/about-fara/fara-
constitution-bylaws/). 
3. See generally Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1688 (2012). 
4. All of which have been considered emerging women’s sports by the NCAA.  See generally 
Heather Dinich, The NCAA Road Less Glorified: Athletes in Emerging Sports Play with Passion but 
Little Fanfare, ESPN (July 20, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4336120.  In 
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achieved.  The response effectively disregarded minority women student-
athletes.  Minority women and other economically disadvantaged student-
athletes are a subset of the larger population of women when resource 
allocations for women’s sports are compared to total resource allocations for 
men’s football, men’s basketball, and track and field.  However, after allocation 
disparities between men’s sports and women’s sports are identified, institutional 
athletic resources are, in addition to women’s basketball, allocated to emerging 
women’s sports, volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, crew, and water polo, to create new 
participation opportunities to remedy gender inequities.  Allocations to 
emerging sports will ensure no, or very few, female minority student-athletes or 
female student-athletes from other readily identifiable subgroups will 
experience the participation benefits promised by Title IX, since few, or 
virtually no, minority female student-athletes or female student-athletes from 
economically disadvantaged communities or from rural or urban communities 
either participate in emerging women’s sports at the interscholastic level5 or at 
 
1991, the NCAA surveyed expenditures for male and female NCAA athletes.  NCAA Emerging Sports 
Timeline, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Emerging%2BSports%2BHistory.doc 
(last visited May 1, 2014).  The survey found that while enrollment in NCAA schools was split 50/50 
between males and females, “male students constitute[d] about 70 percent of the participants in 
intercollegiate athletics” and “receive[d] about 70 percent of athletics scholarship funds, 77 percent of 
operating budgets and 83 percent of recruiting funds.”  Id.  In response to this survey, the NCAA 
created the Gender Equity Task Force in 1992.  Id.  One of the first suggestions of the Task Force was 
to create a list of emerging women’s sports.  Id.  In 1994, the NCAA adopted the Task Force’s first list 
that included nine emerging sports.  Id.  “The NCAA created emerging sports for women as a way to 
generate more opportunities for women in collegiate sports in support of Title IX.”  Dinich, supra.  
Once identified as an emerging sport, “the NCAA allows . . . 10 years for the sport to grow to 40 teams 
over all three divisions [(I, II, and III)] before [the sport] is considered a championship sport” and 
removed from the list of emerging sports.  Id. 
The original nine emerging women’s sports included archery, badminton, bowling, ice hockey, 
rowing, squash, synchronized swimming, team handball, and water polo.  Graham Watson, Emerging 
Sports Find Success, Struggles, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4341135 (last 
updated July 21, 2009).  Equestrian was added to the list in 1998, rugby in 2002, and sand volleyball 
in 2010.  Id.  Rowing, ice hockey, water polo, and bowling were all removed from the list between 1997 
and 2003 because they each gained championship status.  Id.  Additionally, archery, badminton, 
synchronized swimming and team handball were each removed from the list in 2009 for lack of growth.  
Id.  Currently, this leaves rugby, sand volleyball, squash, and equestrian on the list of emerging sports.  
Id. 
5. See generally Deborah L. Brake & Verna L. Williams, The Heart of the Game: Putting Race 
and Educational Equity at the Center of Title IX, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 199, 201 (2008) (“Most 
litigation, public policy, and legal scholarship have focused on athletics at the college level.”) (citing 
Jocelyn Samuels, Reviewing the Play: How Faulty Premises Affected the Work of the Commission on 
Opportunity in Athletics and Why Title IX Protections Are Still Needed to Ensure Equal Opportunity in 
Athletics, 3 MARGINS 233, 255 (2003) (indicating that the absence of data collegiate athletic programs 
are required to keep “makes it difficult to monitor high schools’ compliance with Title IX, where serious 
enforcement of the law is critical”)). 
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the collegiate level of sport.6 
In her seminal article on intersectionality Professor Crenshaw quoted the 
title of Gloria T. Hull’s book, All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, 
but Some of Us Are Brave7 as a beginning point in developing a Black feminist 
critique of antidiscrimination law and feminist legal theory.8  According to 
Professor Crenshaw, the book title indicated what she characterized as “a 
problematic consequence of the tendency to treat race and gender as mutually 
exclusive categories of experience and analysis.”9  Professor Crenshaw’s point 
regarding the marginalization of Black women became evident as I pondered a 
response to my inquiry regarding why the minority gender equity impact is not 
also considered with proposed legislation. 
Although the response to my inquiry focused on the fact that minority equity 
on the men’s side of sports may have been achieved, minority gender equity or 
gender equity for females from broader gender classes—including females from 
economically disadvantaged communities—is not achievable by simply 
balancing resource allocations for gender equity purposes to sports in which 
there is no or very little participation by minority female student-athletes or 
female student-athletes from economically disadvantaged, urban, and rural 
communities.  Increasing resource allocations for female student-athletes in 
women’s volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, crew, and water polo—without at the 
same time investing in emerging sports in middle schools and high schools in 
minority, urban, and rural communities throughout the country—would provide 
miniscule benefits to a significant population of potential collegiate women 
student-athletes.10  Only ten percent of all African-American female student-
 
6. See generally Race and Gender Demographics Search, NCAA.ORG, http://web1.ncaa.org/rgd 
Search/exec/saSearch (search “2010–2011” for “Select an Academic Year” and search “Division I” for 
“Select a Division”; then follow “View Report” hyperlink) [hereinafter Race and Gender 
Demographics Search Division I]. 
7. See generally ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US 
ARE BRAVE (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982). 
8. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 139, 139 (1989). 
9. Id. 
10. Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6.  Between 2010–2011, the 
number of African-American women in each of these Division I sports, were: water polo (5); crew 
(157); lacrosse (53); soccer (451); and volleyball (562).  Id.  This makes a total of only 1,228—or a 
mere 10% of all African-American female Division I athletes, and only 1.6% of all female Division I 
athletes in the NCAA.  See id.  For all NCAA Divisions (I, II, and III), between 2010–2011, the number 
of African-American women in each of these Division I sports, were: water polo (9); crew (196); 
lacrosse (181); soccer (849); and volleyball (1,443).  Race and Gender Demographics Search, 
NCAA.ORG, http://web1.ncaa.org/rgd Search/exec/saSearch (search “2010–2011” for “Select an 
Academic Year” and search “All Divisions” for “Select a Division”; then follow “View Report” 
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athletes who participate in collegiate athletics at the NCAA Division I level 
participate in emerging sports.11  Seventy-five percent of all African-American 
female collegiate student-athletes are participating in the two sports, which they 
have always traditionally had access to: basketball and track and field.12  
Overall, the statistics for Asian and Hispanic girls, girls from economically 
disadvantaged communities, rural communities, and urban communities 
demonstrate that, for them, Title IX’s benefits are only a dream.13 
In order to achieve gender equity for minority female students and female 
students from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities at the 
collegiate level, “gender equity” must be achieved in middle and high school 
athletic programs in minority, urban rural, and economically disadvantaged 
communities.14  Participation opportunities in NCAA designated emerging 
sports must realistically be available to middle school and high schools girls in 
urban, rural, minority, and economically disadvantaged communities. 
Unfortunately for girls from these communities, participation opportunities are 
only available in traditional women’s sports: basketball and track and field.15 
Unless middle school and high school girls in urban, rural, and minority 
communities are given the opportunities to participate in the emerging women’s 
sports, gender equity is being only facially achieved because Title IX 
requirements are implemented without specific regard to detrimental impacts on 
the aforementioned subgroups.16 
This Article will consider the intersection of race, gender, economic status, 
and community characteristics with sports participation for girls in grades K–
12 and will argue that there are two categories of intentional discrimination that 
are both actionable under Title IX.  The first is direct discrimination by a 
perpetrator of the discrimination—the person that directly discriminates against 
victims.17  The second intentional discrimination category is indifferent 
discrimination by a third-party who knows or learns of the direct discrimination, 
 
hyperlink) [hereinafter Race and Gender Demographics Search All Divisions].  This makes a total of 
only 2,678—or a mere 12.3% of all African-American female athletes, and only 1.4% of all female 
athletes across all three NCAA divisions.  See id. 
11. Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6. 
12. Id. 
13. See generally id. 
14. See Brake & Williams, supra note 5, at 201 (“For purposes of increasing young women’s access 
to athletics, a focus on sports opportunities in college is too late, particularly in the increasingly 
competitive environment for women’s intercollegiate sports where there are very few opportunities for 
female college athletes to ‘walk on’ to sports.”). 
15. See generally Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6. 
16. See id. (revealing that African-American female athletes in these sports make up only 10% of 
all African-American female athletes, and only 1.6% of all female athletes in Division I of the NCAA). 
17. See discussion infra Parts IV(A)(1)–(3). 
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has the authority to take corrective action, but fails to take such action.18 
The first category of discriminatory conduct is actionable as traditional 
intentional discrimination where liability is imposed on the perpetrator because 
the perpetrator’s conduct is motivated by a discriminatory purpose.19  The 
second category is more nuanced.  The discriminatory actor in this case is not 
the direct actor.  In fact, the violator may have no motive to discriminate at all, 
or the discrimination experienced by the victim may be unintentional.  The 
violator in this case learns of the discriminatory effect and turns a blind eye to 
the injury.  More accurately, the violator is indifferent to the discriminatory 
effect of its policies or programs.20  It is my contention that this second form of 
intentional discrimination, “deliberate indifference,” is actionable intentional 
discrimination under Title IX. 
A school district may be liable for this second form of intentional 
discrimination where, for example, its allocation of athletic resources provides 
little or no athletic participation opportunities for minority economically 
advantaged female students regardless of how well they have met the interests 
of other female subgroups.21 Such a school district may not be motivated by 
discriminatory animus, but what happens when its administrators learn that their 
actions have worked an unintended discriminatory effect on distinctly 
identifiable subgroups of female students protected under Title IX?  However, 
rather than ameliorating the known discriminatory effects of its resource 
allocation decision making on protected subgroups under Title IX, school 
districts simply ignore the discriminatory effect of their decisions. 
To be certain, the school district’s original “remedial” allocation decision 
making will not, standing alone, breach the Supreme Court’s traditional 
intentional discrimination standard.  However, the intentional act that will result 
in liability is the deliberate indifference to the effects of that decision-making 
on protected subgroups.  The doctrine holds that it is the decision not to 
ameliorate the unintended consequences of its original decision to allocate 
resources that is the wrongful act.22 
Part II of the Article will analyze intersectionality theory as the theoretical 
framework for examining gender equity, minority gender equity, and gender 
inequity occurring under Title IX for females from urban, rural, and 
economically disadvantaged communities.  Part III of the Article will analyze 
sport participation statistics for female students in K–12 and will provide 
 
18. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(4). 
19. See infra Part IV(A)(4). 
20. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5). 
21. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5). 
22. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5). 
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statistical support for notice to interscholastic educators, athletic administrators, 
and school district authorities of gender inequity suffered by female students 
from minority, urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities.  
Although the gender inequities may not have been caused by actionable 
intentional discrimination according to the Supreme Court’s traditional 
intentional discrimination doctrine under Title IX, actions or inaction by these 
institutions may subject them to liability for their deliberate indifference to the 
plight of female students affected by institutional policy decisions. 
In Part IV, I will articulate the legal basis for establishing a claim for 
deliberate indifference intentional discrimination under Title IX.  Part IV will 
first trace the development of the Supreme Court’s intentional discrimination 
doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Title VI, 
and Title IX23 and will argue that the actions or policies of interscholastic 
institutions reflect a second form of intentional discrimination because of these 
institutions’ deliberate indifference to the impact of their actions or policies on 
minority girls and girls from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged 
communities. 
Part V will conclude that interscholastic educational institutions may be 
held liable for their failure to achieve gender equity under Title IX for girls from 
minority, urban, and rural communities, and girls from economically 
disadvantaged communities, where educational institutions knew of gender 
inequity within these subgroups of females and failed to take adequate measures 
to improve participation opportunities for girls from those communities. 
II.  INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY PROVIDES A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY FOR GIRLS FROM MINORITY, URBAN, AND 
DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES 
Intersectionality theory represents a strategy for hastening legal recognition 
that identity status has legal consequences and that the forms of discrimination 
one is likely to face depend on one’s identity status within a given social 
group.24  Intersectionality theory rejects the assumption that all women—of 
varying ages, ethnicities, backgrounds, sexual orientation, and political and 
geographic locations—have identical experiences.25 
According to intersectionality theory, before a court can determine whether 
a plaintiff was the victim of actionable discrimination, it should first consider 
 
23. See discussion infra Parts IV(A)(1)–(3). 
24. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
701, 702 (2001). (“[D]ifferent status identity holders within any given social group are differently 
situated with respect to how much, and the form of, discrimination they are likely to face.”). 
25. Id. 
FERGUSON ARTICLE  - FORMATTED FINAL 6/4/2014  4:07 PM 
2014] GENDER EQUITY UNDER TITLE IX 359 
the identity status the plaintiff occupies.26  Paying attention to the plaintiff’s 
specific identity status allows the court to distinguish between the typical 
conceptualization of racial discrimination as an inter-group phenomenon, where 
discrimination is based on a whole racial or gender group,27 and intra-group 
discrimination, where the discrimination is based on one’s different identity 
status within a particular racial or gender group.28 
In her seminal article on intersectionality, Crenshaw’s analysis focused on 
three cases29 to illustrate “a common political and theoretical approach to 
discrimination which operates to marginalize Black women.”30  Her critique 
went beyond the courts, arguing that feminists and civil rights thinkers 
committed the same wrong by denying both the unique compoundedness of 
Black women’s conditions and Black women’s experiences—as both women 
and as Blacks (which often times means Black men)—place them at the 
intersection of the classes of women and Blacks.31  The compoundedness of 
Black women’s condition allows for Black women, at times, to be absorbed into 
the collective experience of women or the collective experience of Blacks.32  At 
other times, Black women are considered so different from either group that 
their interests are marginalized by both groups.33  According to Professor 
Crenshaw, this failure is due less to the “absence of political will to include 
Black women,” and more to “an uncritical and disturbing acceptance of 
dominant ways of thinking about discrimination.”34 
 
26. Id. (“For example, if the plaintiff bringing a discrimination suit is a heterosexual Asian 
American female attorney, courts should adjudicate her discrimination claim with that status identity 
in mind.  More specifically, the fact that the employer in question treated Asian American men (or 
white or other women) well should not be taken as dispositive evidence that the employer did not either 
exhibit animus towards or harbor negative impressions of Asian American women.”). 
27. Id. at 703 (“Typically, courts conceptualize racial discrimination as an inter-group distinction, 
a distinction, for example, between whites and Asian Americans.  Under this conceptualization, an 
Asian American plaintiff, will typically be required to demonstrate that she was treated differently 
(disparately) from a similarly situated non-Asian American (usually a white) employee.”). 
28. Id. (“[I]t is possible that [a] firm prefers Asian American men to Asian American women, 
discriminating against the latter but not the former.  Framing the discrimination question solely in terms 
of the plaintiff’s Asian American identity ignores the fact that the plaintiff’s discrimination could be a 
function of [a] more specific status identity, her identity as an Asian American female.”). 
29. See Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 141–150 (Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th 
Cir. 1983); Payne v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982); DeGraffenreid v. General 
Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976)). 
30. Id. at 150. 
31. Id. at 139 n.3, 150. 
32. Id. at 150. 
33. Id. 
34. Id.  In support of her argument Professor Crenshaw directs us to: 
Consider first the definition of discrimination that seems to be operative in antidiscrimination law:  
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A similar critique may be hurled at gender equity analysis reflected in the 
law under Title IX and in the practices and policies within interscholastic 
institutions.  First, by denying the compoundedness of minority student-
athletes’ situation and the situation of females from urban, disadvantaged, and 
rural communities, these female student-athletes are “absorbed into the 
collective experiences of either”35 white female student-athletes or minority 
male student-athletes.  In that case, minority female student-athletes are counted 
with white females students for purposes of determining whether 
proportionality exists under a Title IX analysis.36 Yet, their differences from 
white female and minority male students place minority female student-athletes 
and female student-athletes from urban, disadvantaged, and rural communities 
at the margin because their differences are not adequately considered when 
devising Title IX solutions. Minority female student-athletes and female 
student-athletes from urban, disadvantaged, and rural communities are at the 
margin because emerging women’s sports offer no real participation 
opportunities for student-athletes with these identity characteristics. The so-
called emerging women’s sports and former NCAA designated emerging 
women’s sports can pragmatically be described as emerging sports for white 
female student-athletes or for female student-athletes from economically 
advantaged communities who may, for all practical purposes, reflect the same 
population of female student-athletes.37 
III.  MINORITY GENDER EQUITY AND GENDER EQUITY FOR FEMALE 
STUDENT-ATHLETES FROM DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES CANNOT BE 
ACHIEVED AT THE COLLEGIATE LEVEL WITHOUT REFORMING POLICY 
DECISION MAKING IN INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETICS 
Although Title IX has resulted in tremendous gains for women across a 
broad opportunity spectrum, ranging from employment, to educational and 
media exposure, to athletic participation opportunities, minority women and 
 
Discrimination which is wrongful proceeds from the identification of a specific class or category; either a 
discriminator intentionally identifies this category, or a process is adopted which somehow disadvantages 
all members of this category.  According to the dominant view, a discriminator treats all people within a 
race or sex category similarly.  Any significant experiential or statistical variation within this group suggests 
either that the group is not being discriminated against or that conflicting interests exist which defeat any 
attempts to bring a common claim.  Consequently, one generally cannot combine these categories.  Race 
and sex, moreover, become significant only when they operate to explicitly disadvantage the victims; 
because the privileging of whiteness or maleness is implicit, it is generally not perceived at all. 
Id. at 150–151 (citations omitted). 
35. Id. at 150. 
36. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5). 
37. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5). 
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girls from disadvantaged communities continue to lag behind in realizing the 
deliverance Title IX promised.  Before enactment of Title IX, minority women 
student-athletes participated primarily in basketball and track and field.38  Forty 
years after enactment of that monumental piece of legislation, minority 
women’s athletic participation opportunities remain limited predominantly to 
basketball and track and field.39  Unless a conscious effort is made to ensure 
minority female student-athletes and female students from disadvantaged 
communities are not left behind in the aftermath of Title IX, athletic 
participation opportunities for these subgroups of female student-athletes will 
stagnate at current, unacceptable levels.40 
Emerging women’s sports and formerly designated NCAA emerging 
women’s sports are the sports vehicles through which gender equity is being 
achieved at the collegiate level of sports. However, unless participation 
opportunities in emerging sports are provided to minority girls and girls from 
urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities in middle and high 
schools, true gender equity in intercollegiate athletics cannot be achieved.  Both 
intercollegiate and interscholastic institutions have an affirmative obligation 
under Title IX to remedy known cases of gender discrimination.  Conscious 
indifference to unique gender equity issues experienced by minority girls and 
girls from urban, economically disadvantaged, and rural communities 
constitutes discrimination under Title IX.  Further, policy choices made by 
interscholastic administrators which reduce, eliminate, or fail to offer, or that 
deprive minority females from identified communities of athletic participation 
opportunities, constitute intentional discrimination under Title IX.41 
Sport participation opportunities statistics for both majority and minority 
girls in K–12 and girls from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged 
communities demonstrate that, although gender equity under Title IX has 
provided clear sports participation opportunity gains for Caucasian female 
student-athletes, minority female student-athletes and other female student-
athletes still lag far behind participation opportunities experienced by majority 
female students.42  Because female student-athletes from minority, urban, rural, 
and economically disadvantaged communities have limited access to emerging 
 
38. Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the Junction, 6 
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 239, 257 (1996) (“Black women were locked into a system that did not offer them 
very many opportunities as women and when it did it had very few resources for them.  Like Black 
men, they encounter stereotyping and stacking within the sports world which steers them into basketball 
and track.” (citation omitted)). 
39. Id.; Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6. 
40. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5). 
41. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5). 
42. See discussion infra Part III(A). 
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sports, participation opportunities are limited to traditional women’s sports and 
are practically nonexistent for these subgroups through emerging women’s 
sports. 
A.  Race, Ethnicity, Community Location, and Family Financial 
Characteristics Adversely Impact Sports Participation Rates of Girls in 
Grades 3–12 
Children’s athletic ability and interest in physical activity takes shape and 
blossoms or dwindles in a social matrix that includes schools, churches, 
community organizations, after-school programs, government, and economic 
forces.43  The idea that children’s athletic ability and interest in physical activity 
takes shape in a social matrix seems reminiscent of the popular saying “it takes 
a village to raise a child.”44  Sport molds character, reveals flaws and, for those 
who are willing to admit what sports often reveals about one’s character, sports 
can contribute to transforming girls into women and boys into men.45  Any 
attempt, therefore, to achieve gender equity under Title IX without seeking to 
understand what factors influence sports participation opportunities for minority 
and majority girls, affirms a status quo where minority girls and other girls 
continue to lag behind in having meaningful access to the sports participation 
opportunities promised by Title IX. 
Addressing the dilemma faced by adolescent and preadolescent female 
students from minority, urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged 
communities will require transformational changes in policy decision making 
engaged in by urban educators, education administrators, and interscholastic 
athletic administrators.  The sports participation disparity between athletic 
participation rates of K–12 minority girls and girls from urban and suburban 
communities confirms why, unless there is a change in thinking, “authentic 
gender equity” under Title IX cannot be achieved.46  As a whole, more children 
 
43. See generally DON SABO & PHIL VELIZ, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., GO OUT AND PLAY: 
YOUTH SPORTS IN AMERICA (2008), available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/en/home/re 
search/articles-and-reports/mental-and-physical-health/go-out-and-play [hereinafter GO OUT AND 
PLAY]. 
44. See, e.g., HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS 
CHILDREN TEACH US 12 (1996) (describing the old African proverb “it takes a village” and the 
reasoning for incorporating it into the title of her book). 
45. The transformation that sports can facilitate in girls and boys may be accelerated or hindered 
depending on whether adults, coaches, and leaders of youth are themselves sufficiently mature to accept 
what their own successes or failures in sports should have taught them and the character development 
that should have resulted from such recognition; for one cannot teach that which one has not been open 
to learn or impart insight if one has not been willing to accept what the light has revealed about one’s 
successes and failures. 
46. See discussion infra Part III. 
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are involved in organized sports and participate on sports teams than ever in our 
history.47  A national school-based survey of students and parents, conducted 
on behalf of the Women’s Sports Foundation, revealed that race, gender, 
ethnicity, the community in which girls live and attend school, economic 
disparities, and family characteristics impact sports and sports participation 
rates for children from the 3rd through 12th grades.48  Results of the study, 
summarized in the Women’s Sports Foundation report, Go Out and Play,49 
demonstrate that far too many of our minority girls, girls from urban and rural 
communities, and girls from economically disadvantaged communities are 
missing out on the opportunities that sports can provide. 
Go Out and Play was the result of a study that was conducted by Harris 
Interactive, Inc., on behalf of the Women’s Sports Foundation and the Center 
for Research on Physical Activity, Sport & Health at D’Youville College, which 
collaborated in developing the study.50  The study measured the participation 
rates of girls and boys in both exercise and organized team sports nationally.51  
The study was intersectional in that its central focus was on how the intersection 
of race, gender, family income, and urbanicity52 are related to children’s interest 
and participation in physical activity and athletics.53 
During the study, two nationwide surveys were conducted and both helped 
to form the basis upon which the conclusions of the report were drawn.  The 
first of the two surveys was a school-based survey conducted on youth randomly 
selected from a pool of some 100,000 public and private schools in the United 
States.54  The national sample size consisted of 2,185 3rd-through-12th-grade 
 
47. GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 8 (demonstrating that of the “estimated 7,342,910 
children [who] participated in high schools sports during the 2006–2007 school year,” little is known 
about sports participation before high school). 
48. Id. at 2–3. 
49. Id. at 2–5. 
50. Id. at ii. 
51. Id. at 2. 
52. Urbanicity was used as a variable in the study and defined as, 
The urbanicity code (Q410) in the parent survey data file reflects the urbanicity of the plurality of 
households in that exchange (the first three digits of a seven-digit phone number, a level of greater detail 
than the area code alone).  It is not based on a respondents’ [sic] answers.  Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 
as documented by the Office of Management and Budget, determine urbanicity.  Locations in a central city 
of a MSA are coded as Urban.  Location not in a central city of a MSA are coded as suburban. Locations 
not in an MSA are coded as rural.  Urbanicity coding is interative process.  Census tracts are first coded by 
urbanicity based on the plurality of the population in the tract.  Then tract-level codes are converted to 
exchange-level codes again based on the disposition of the plurality of the population of households. 
Id. at 174, 178. 
53. Id. at 2. 
54. Id. 
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girls and boys.55  Phone interviews were also conducted with 863 randomly 
selected parents of 3rd-through-12th-grade children.56  Although all parents 
were asked their thoughts and feelings about their children’s involvement and 
interest in physical activity and sport to deepen researchers understanding of the 
needs and experiences girls, boys, and the families of underserved populations, 
African-American and Hispanic parents were over-sampled.57 
1.   Race Effects Participation Rates: Minority Girls Participate in Sports and 
Sporting Activities at Significantly Lower Rates than Majority Girls 
Participate 
The idea that a person’s specific identity status has social, legal, minority 
gender equity, and gender equity consequences is evident when one considers 
how race and gender intersect to limit sports opportunities for Asian, African-
American, and Hispanic girls.  Figure 1.1 below demonstrates the results of the 
study when race, gender, and ethnicity were examined.  Caucasian girls 
represented 60% of the students who participated in organized sports, whereas 
the percentage of minority girls participated in sports was far lower.58  Only 
15% of the African-American girls who were surveyed participated in organized 
sports, while Hispanic girls represented a slightly higher percentage at 17%.  
The participation rate for Asian girls, however, was significantly lower than any 
other minority groups.  Only 8% of Asian girls surveyed indicated they 
participated in organized sports.59  The participation rate for Asian boys almost 
doubled that of Asian girls at 13%.60  Asian girls represent a minority group for 
which Title IX efforts have not closed the minority gender equity gap. 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 15. 
59. Id.  It is not clear whether there are cultural issues in play with respect to Asians. 
60. Compare infra Figure 1.1 with infra Figure 1.2. 
FERGUSON ARTICLE  - FORMATTED FINAL 6/4/2014  4:07 PM 
2014] GENDER EQUITY UNDER TITLE IX 365 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
When female participation rates by race and the level of sports 
involvement—measured by whether girls were not involved, moderately 
involved,63 or highly involved64—is reviewed, a troubling trend is observed for 
Asian girls.  The percent of Asian girls that did not participate in sports was 
higher than any other racial group at 47%.  In addition, the percent of Asian 
girls who were moderately or highly involved in sports was lower than any other 
racial group.  Of the girls surveyed, 44% of Asian girls indicated they were 
moderately involved in sports.  On the other hand, 54% of Caucasian girls 
surveyed indicated they were moderately involved in sports, as compared to 
50% of Hispanic girls and 47% of African-American girls. 
The survey results for girls highly involved in sports, displayed in Figure 
1.3 below, showed a precepitious decline for all racial groups.  The participation 
rate for Asian girls ranked the lowest of all other racial groups at 9%.  The 
 
61. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 15. 
62. Id. 
63. Students moderately involved in sports are defined as those who participated in one or two 
sports over the last twelve months.  Id. at 11. 
64. Students highly involved in sports are defined as those who participated in three or more sports 
over the last twelve months.  Id. 
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participation rate for highly involved Caucasian girls was higher than all racial 
groups at 22%, followed by African-American girls at 17%, and Hispanic girls 
at 14%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 65 
The phenomenon witnessed with respect to the participation rate for Asian 
girls was not repeated for Asian boys.  Figure 1.4 below demonstrates that Asian 
boys had virtually the lowest nonparticipation rate at 22%, nearly identical to 
that of African-American boys at 21%.  Unlike Asian girls, who represented the 
lowest participation rate of all racial groups for girls moderately involved in 
sports, Asian boys were tied at 43% with Caucasian boys, while African-
American and Hispanic boys showed the two highest participation rates at 49% 
and 47%, respectively.  Asian boys, however, represented the highest percent of 
boys who were highly involved in sports at 35%, higher than all other racial 
groups.  Caucasian boys were highly involved in sports at a rate of 31%, 
followed by African-American boys at 30%, and Hispanic boys at 25%.  
Literally, the participation rate of Asian girls signals a troubling minority gender 
equity and gender equity challenge.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          67 
 
65. Id. at 16. 
66. Compare supra Figure 1.3 with supra Figure 1.4. 
67. GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 16. 
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Figure 1.4:  Boys’ Involvement in Sports by Race 
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2.   The Gender Equity Participation Gap that Persists Between Minority Girls 
and Boys Demands a Title IX Remedy 
When the gender gap between boys and girls is compared across racial 
groups, the participation predicament of Asian girls and other minority girls is 
evident.  Title IX imposes an affirmative obligation on interscholastic school 
districts, educators, and athletic administrators to address the significantly larger 
gender gap—which persists between minority girls and boys when compared to 
Caucasian girls and boys—where these institutions learn of the disparity.68  
Figure 2.1 below examines the gender gap by race for boys and girls not 
involved, moderately involved, and highly involved in participating in sports.  
When the participation gap between boys and girls is examined for students who 
reported they were not involved, moderately involved, or highly involved in 
sports, unmistakable trends are observable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     69 
First, there was a significant persistent gender gap, more than any other 
racial group, in the nonparticipation rate of Asian girls and boys.  The statistics 
demonstrated that Asian girls were 25% more likely than Asian boys to not 
participate in sporting activity.  This percentage is higher than in any other racial 
group.  African-American girls were 15% more likely than African boys to not 
participate in sports and sporting activity.  Caucasian girls, however, are doing 
better with respect to the gap between nonparticipation rates than for boys and 
girls from other racial groups; Caucasian girls were 2% less likely than 
Caucasian boys to not participate in sports.  Looking at it from the perspective 
of Caucasian boys, Caucasian boys were 2% more likely than Caucasian girls 
 
68. See discussion infra Part IV(A)(5). 
69. See generally GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 16.  The statistics from Figure 1.3, supra, 
and Figure 1.4, supra, were used to create this Figure 2.1, which shows the participation gender gap 
between Caucasian boys and girls and the participation gender gap between African-American, 
Hispanic, and Asian boys and girls. 
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to not participate in sports.  The lowest nonparticipation rate for minority groups 
was that of Hispanic girls.  Hispanic girls were only 8% more likely than 
Hispanic boys to not participate in sports. 
The gender gap statistics for girls moderately involved in sports revealed 
that the gender gap between minority girls and boys widens when compared to 
the gender gap between Caucasian boys and girls.  Caucasian girls were 11% 
more likely than Caucasian boys to be moderately involved in sport.  The gender 
participation gap for Hispanics and Asians decreased, meaning that these girls 
were more likely to be moderately involved in sports than that of their male 
counterparts.  Specifically, Hispanic girls were 7% more likely and Asian girls 
were 1% more likely than Hispanic and Asian boys to be moderately involved 
in sports.  Except for African-American girls, the gender gap between girls and 
boys for all racial groups contracted and girls were more likely than boys in 
their racial group to be moderately involved in sports.  The gender participation 
gap for African-American girls was the inverse of the other racial groups.  
African-American girls were 2% less likely than African-American boys to be 
moderately involved in sports. 
Finally, when the statistics for girls and boys who were highly involved in 
sports were reviewed, the gender gap for all racial groups increased.  Asian girls 
were 26% less likely than Asian boys, African-American girls were 13% less 
likely than African-American boys, Hispanic girls were 11% less likely than 
Hispanic boys, and Caucasian girls were 9% less likely than Caucasian boys to 
be highly involved in sports. Clearly, these figures demonstrate that although 
the participation gap increased for all racial groups, minority girls—particularly 
Asian girls—were more affected.  The minority gender equity needs seem to be 
far greater for Asian girls.  Asian girls were 25% more likely than Asian boys 
to not be involved in sports and 26% less likely than Asian boys to be highly 
involved in sports.70 
3.   Family Income has a Significant Impact on Nonparticipating Gender Gap 
Between Girls and Boys in Grades 3–12 
The compoundedness of minority girls’ experiences—when they 
specifically identity as African-American and Hispanic girls and they 
experience family income disparities—as the research corroborated, work 
together to increase the sports nonparticipation rates for minority girls.  As a 
result, a single axis approach to addressing gender equity under Title IX 
marginalizes African-American and Hispanic girls, who are disproportionately 
 
70. Compare supra Figure 1.3 with supra Figure 1.4. 
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poor or live in urban communities.71 
i.  The Correlation Between Family Income and Nonparticipation Rate for 
Girls in 3rd–8th Grade72 Demonstrates that Family Income Impacts 
Gender Equity Under Title IX 
We have learned from the study that not only do race and community 
characteristics—urban, rural, or suburban—impact sports participation rates 
across grades, but so does family income.73  The survey results for girls not 
participating in sports during the 3rd-through-8th grades,74 displayed in Figure 
3.1 below, revealed that as family income increased, the nonparticipation rate 
for girls decreased from 32% for families with yearly income of $35,000 and 
lower, to its lowest levels of 15% for families whose median income is between 
$50,001 and $65,000.  A decrease in nonparticipation is a good sign, because it 
signals that, as family income increases, fewer girls in the 3rd through 8th 
grades were sitting on the sidelines when it comes to sports participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     75 
There were, however, slight increases in the nonparticipation rate for 3rd 
through 8th grade girls from two groups as family income increased.  The first 
 
71. Steven Perlberg, American Median Incomes by Race Since 1967, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17, 
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-median-income-in-the-us-by-race-2013-9.  According to 
the article, Asian households recorded the highest median household income, according to the Census 
Bureau, in 2012 of $68,636.  Id.  The median family income was $57,009 for non-Hispanic White 
households, $33,321 for African-American (Black) households, $39,005 for Hispanic households.  Id. 
72. The survey compared nonparticipation and participation rates to family income for two grading 
groups: (1) the 3rd through 8th grades; and (2) the 9th through 12th grades.  GO OUT AND PLAY, supra 
note 43, at 17. 
73. Id. at 16 (“The ‘community income level’ was measured by determining the median family 
income within the U.S. census track that each of the participating schools in the student survey was 
located.”). 
74. The survey compared nonparticipation and participation rates to family income for two grading 
groups: (1) the 3rd through 8th grades, and (2) the 9th through 12th grades.  See infra Figure 3.1. 
75. GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 17. 
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Figure 3.2:  Non-Athletic Involvement for Boys by 
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of these increases occurred in families earning between $35,001 and $50,000.  
In that income group, the nonparticipation rate increased to 37%, the highest 
nonparticipation rate of all income levels.  The reason for this increase warrants 
further investigation.76  After the nonparticipation rate had its most sizable drop 
from 37% for families earning $35,001 to $50,000 to 15% for families earning 
$50,001 to $65,000, nonparticipation increased slightly to 18% for families 
earning $65,001 and higher.  This increase was not nearly as significant as was 
noted with families earning between $35,001 and $50,000 annually. 
Unlike the experience of girls, the nonparticipation rate for boys in the 3rd-
through-8th grades, displayed in Figure 3.2 below, showed a steady decline as 
family income increased.  The nonparticipation rate for boys in the 3rd-through-
8th grades is 26% for boys from families with a median income of $35,000 or 
lower, which is one percentage point lower than its highest level.  The 
nonparticipation rate increased to its highest level for 3rd-through-8th grade 
boys to 27% for families with a median income of $35,001 to $50,000, and then 
dropped to 17% at the $50,001 to $65,000 median income range.  The 
nonparticipation rate dropped again to 14% at the highest median income level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     77 
Figure 3.3 below demonstrates that as family income increased, girls in 3rd-
through-8th grades with families having median incomes of $50,001 to $65,000 
were no longer sitting on the sidelines at a greater rate than boys.  The gender 
gap between girls and boys who are not participating in sports from families 
with income of $35,000 or lower is 6%—indicating that 6% more girls than 
boys from families with incomes of $35,000 or lower were not participating in 
sports.  As family income increased into the $35,001 to $50,000 range, the 
 
76. This is subject matter is left for a subsequent article. 
77. Id. 
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nonparticipation gender gap also increased to 10%.  At these income ranges, 
10% more girls than boys were not participating in sports in the 3rd-through-
8th grades.78  However, for girls from families with median incomes of between 
$50,001 and $65,000, the nonparticipation rate began to decrease significantly 
relative to that of boys in 3rd-through-8th grades, so that 2% less girls than boys 
were sitting on the sidelines.79  Although the nonparticipation rate dropped 
again for boys from families with a median of $65,001 and higher, the 
nonparticipation rate for girls increased so that 4% more girls than boys are not 
participating in sports.80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           81 
Clearly, since African-American and Hispanics are minorities groups who 
are overrepresented in the two lower median income groups—$35,000 and 
lower and between $35,001 and $50,00082—the high nonparticipation rate of 
3rd-through-8th-grade girls in these income groups raises minority gender 
equity as well as “economic gender equity” concerns under Title IX.  The 
nonparticipation rates for 3rd-through-8th-grade girls from families in these two 
 
78. The nonparticipation rate for boys increased slightly from 26% to 27% for boys from families 
with incomes in the $35,001 to $50,000 range.  However, the nonparticipation rate of girls increased 
from 32% to 37%, demonstrating a 10% increase in the nonparticipation rate of girls. 
79. According to Figure 3.3, infra, 3rd–8th grade girls are 2% less likely than boys to not 
participate in sporting activities.  Figure 3.1, supra, and Figure 3.2, infra, indicate that the 
nonparticipating rate for boys dropped to 17%, while the girls’ nonparticipation rate dropped to 15%, 
for families earning a median income between $50,001 and $65,000. 
80. The data points in Figures 3.2, infra, demonstrate that the nonparticipation of boys dropped to 
14% for family median income of $65,001 and higher.  However, Figure 3.1, supra, showed that the 
nonparticipation of girls increased to 18% for girls from families with median income of $65,001 and 
higher.  This nonparticipation rate indicates 4% more 3rd-through-8th-grade girls than boys are not 
participating in sports, even at this income range. 
81. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 17. 
82. Id.; see also Perlberg, supra note 71. 
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income ranges also correspond to the high nonparticipation rate for girls that 
live in urban communities, as well as African-American and Hispanic girls.  
Family income and community characteristics may not adequately explain the 
nonparticipation rate of Asian girls, however.  The study revealed that race, 
income disparity, and community characteristics work together to increase the 
sports nonparticipation rates for minority girls.83  As a result, a single axis 
approach to addressing gender equity under Title IX marginalizes minority girls, 
who are disproportionately poor and live in urban communities, and also fails 
to remedy a growing minority gender equity problem in sports.  The single axis 
approach also marginalized girls from urban, rural, and disadvantaged 
communities.84 
ii.   During the 9th–12th Grades, as Family Income Increases, the 
Nonparticipation Rate for Girls Decreases 
Survey results were not only very different for girls and boys in the 9th-
through-12th grades, the results raise broader gender equity and minority gender 
equity concerns.  The percentage of both girls and boys who are not participating 
in sports activity during the 9th-through-12th grades are considerably higher 
than during earlier grades, however.85  The nonparticipation rate for 9th-
through-12th-grade girls and boys were high across all income groups.  For 
example, the nonparticipation rate for girls from families with family income of 
$35,000 and lower income is 43%.86  While the nonparticipation rate for boys 
is lower than that of girls, 31%, that figure is significantly higher than for 3rd-
through-8th-grade boys.87  At this median family income level, 12% more girls 
than boys surveyed indicate they did not participate in sports. 
The nonparticipation rate for girls and boys dropped and remained relatively 
close to each other between families with median family incomes of $35,001 to 
$50,000.88  The nonparticipation gender gap drops to 4%: only 4% more girls 
are not participating in sports during high school than boys.  Although the 
nonparticipation rate of girls from families with a median income of $50,001 to 
 
83. Id.  Since Asian household median incomes are the highest among minority groups, one would 
not expect the high nonparticipation gender gap of Asian girls and this is demonstrated in Figure 2.1, 
supra.  Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Compare the nonparticipation rate statistics for girls in Figure 3.1, supra with Figure 3.2, supra. 
86. The nonparticipation rate for 3rd-through-8th-grade girls from the same family income bracket 
is 32%. 
87. The nonparticipation rate for 3rd-through-8th-grade boys from the same family income bracket 
is 26%. 
88. The nonparticipation rate for girls at this median family income bracket was 31%, while the 
nonparticipation rate for boys was 27%.  See supra Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2. 
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$65,000 is unchanged, the nonparticipation rate for boys increased to 31%, 
resulting in a nonparticipation gap of zero.  The nonparticipation rate for both 
girls and boys from families with a median income of $65,001 and higher 
increased,89 so that only 3% more girls than boys are not participating in sports 
activities.  Why such a drastic change in the nonparticipation rate during 9th-
through-12th grades as compared to the nonparticipation rate witnessed in 3rd-
through-8th grades is unclear.90 
4.   Participation Rates for Highly Involved 3rd-through-8th-Grade Girls and 
Boys and Family Income 
Figure 4.1 confirms that as family income increases, there is a 
corresponding increase in the participation rate of 3rd-through-8th-grade girls 
who were highly involved in sports.  The participation rate of 3rd-through-8th-
grade girls increased from 17% for girls from families with family income of 
$35,000 or lower to 19% for girls from families with family income of $35,001 
to $50,000.  On the other hand, the participation rate for boys highly involved 
in sports increased from 27% to 33%.  The participation rate increased again for 
both genders to 27%, for girls from families with family income in the $50,001 
to $65,000 range, and to 45% for boys highly involved in sports activities.  At 
the highest family income bracket, $65,001 and over, the participation rate for 
3rd-through-8th-grade girls increased to 34%; however, the participation rate 
for boys in the same grades and family income level dropped slightly to 44%. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     91 
The gender gap between girls and boys at each family income level was 
even more pronounced.  As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, there was a 10% gender 
participation gender gap between girls and boys from families with median 
 
89. Compare supra Figure 3.1 (where the nonparticipation of girls is increase to 36%) with supra 
Figure 3.2 (where the nonparticipation rate for boys increase to 33%). 
90. That question is left for a subsequent article. 
91. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 18. 
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Figure 4.3:  Gender Gap for High Athletic Involvement Girls 
and Boys by Community Income 
3rd-8th
Grades
9th-12th
Grades
family income of $35,000 or lower: meaning that 10% more boys than girls 
were highly involved in sports in the 3rd through 8th grades at lower median 
family incomes.  As family income increased to between $35,001 and $50,000, 
the gender participation gap also increased.  According to the survey, as the 
median family income increased to between $35,001 and $50,000, 14% more 
boys than girls were highly involved in sports.  As median family increased to 
between $50,001 and $65,000, the participation gender gap increased to 18%, 
indicating that 18% more boys than girls were highly involved in sports in that 
median family income range.  Although the participation rate for boys in the 
3rd-through-8th grades dropped by 1% for boys from families earning $65,001 
or higher, the participation gender gap was still at 10%; meaning that 10% more 
boys than girls were highly involved in sports in the 3rd-through-8th grades.  
According to the survey results, there are grave gender equity concerns for high 
school girls that have not been adequately addressed under Title IX. 
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92. Id. 
93. See id. 
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5.   Participation Rates for Highly Involved 9th-through-12th-Grade Girls and 
Boys and Family Income 
The graph of the participation rates for 9th-through-12th-grade girls who 
were highly involved in sports by family income in Figure 4.1 was umbrella 
shaped.  Whereas, the graph of the nonparticipation rates for girls in the 9th-
through-12th grades in Figure 3.1 was shaped like an upside down umbrella, 
demonstrating an inverse relationship between the nonparticipation rates for 
girls in the 9th-through-12th grades and the participation rates of highly 
involved 9th-through-12th-grade girls from families with the same family 
income characteristics.  As family median income increased for 9th-grade-
through-12th-grade girls, the participation rate of girls highly involved in sports 
steadily increased, slightly more than doubling from 7% for girls from families 
with income of $35,000 or lower to 16% for girls from families with income 
between $35,001 and $50,000.  The participation rate remained the same at 16% 
for girls from families with income between $50,001 and $65,000.  The 
participation rate of highly involved girls in the 9th-through-12th grades 
dropped back almost to that of the lowest income level at 11% hence the 
umbrella shaped graphic. 
The upside down shaped umbrella graphic depicting the nonparticipation 
rate by family income tracked in Figure 3.1, demonstrates that the 
nonparticipation rate for 9th-through-12th-grade girls was highest at 43%, for 
girls from families with income of $35,000 or lower. The nonparticipation rate 
dropped to 31% for girls from families with family income between $35,001 
and $50,000 and remained the same for girls from families with family income 
between $50,001 and $65,000.  Although the nonparticipation rate at the highest 
family income level ($65,001 and higher) increased to 36%, it did not reach its 
highest rate.  Instead the highest rate was seen for girls from families with the 
lowest family income at 43%. 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 both confirm that significant changes in 
participation rates occur for both girls and boys during 9th through 12th grades.  
While the participation rate for girls highly involved in sports from families 
whose median income was $35,000 or lower was only 7%, the participation rate 
increased and remained at 16% for girls from families with median incomes 
between $35,001 to $50,000 and $50,001 to $65,000.  The participation rate 
dipped to 11% for girls from families earning $65,001 or more.  The 
participation rates for boys, however, were highest at both the lowest median 
income range, $35,000 and lower, and highest when the median income was in 
the range of $65,001 and higher.  At both these income ranges, the participation 
rate for boys highly involved in sports was 24%, representing significant 
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participation gender gap between boys and girls at both family income ranges.  
As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, while at the lowest income range 17% more boys 
than girls were highly involved in sports, at the highest median income range 
13% more boys than girls were highly involved in sports in the 9th through 12th 
grades.  The participation gender gap remained the same at 5% for both the 
$35,001 to $50,000 and $50,001 to $65,000 median income categories—only 
5% more boys than girls were highly involved in sports at this grade backet.  
Even at the highest income brackets, more work still remains to be done to 
satisfy the directives of Title IX.  Where interscholastic institutions, 
administrators, educators, and athletic programs are aware that the gender gap 
continues to presist for girls belonging to specific identity groups—including 
racial minority groups, and girls from urban, rural and economically 
disadvantaged communities—and fail to take steps to alleviate the 
discrimination faced by these identity groups, the insitutions has acted 
deliberately indifferent to the discrimination faced by these identitiy groups.  
Deliberate indifference constitutes intentional discrimination under Title IX, 
and Title IX may be relied on to remedy this form of gender discrimination.94 
6.   Variations in Minority Gender Gap in Athletic Participation Driven by 
Race and Community Income 
The study revealed that family financial resources was one of several factors 
that effected both gender equity and also minority gender equity.  Family 
financial resources,95 race,96 and community characteristics,97 all of which 
separately effect gender equity, operate as additives98 that profoundly influence 
gender equity.  This section considers the relationship between race (children of 
color),99 family income, and gender for children highly involved in sports.  As 
shown in Figure 6.1 below, after studying race and family income, it became 
clear that the participation rate for Caucasian girls highly involved in sports 
progressively increased as family income increased.  Caucasian girls from 
families with median family income of $35,000 or lower that were highly 
involved in sports participated at a rate of 9%.  The participation rate for these 
girls doubled to 18% for families earning between $35,001 and $50,000.  There 
 
94. See infra Part IV(A)(4). 
95. See discussion supra Parts III(A)(3)–(5). 
96. See discussion Part III(A)(6). 
97. See discussion infra Parts III(A)(7)–(9). 
98. See discussion Part III. 
99. It is not clear why the study examined the participation rate of “children of color” and not the 
participation rate for the specific racial identity groups that were considered in the study: Caucasians, 
Hispanics, African-Americans, and Asians. 
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was a slight increase in the participation rate to 23% for Caucasian girls from 
families with median family incomes of between $50,001 and $65,000.  
However, the largest increase in participation rates occurred for Caucasian girls 
from families earning $65,001 or higher—the participation rate improved to 
38%. 
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The experience of girls of color was significantly different from that of 
Caucasian girls. The participation rate of girls of color highly involved in sports, 
from families earning $35,000 or lower, was significantly higher than that of 
Caucasian girls at 15%.  Girls of color, with a median family income between 
$35,001 and $50,000 who were highly involved in sports, participate in sport at 
a rate of 16%, two percentage points lower than Caucasian girls.  The 
participation rate of girls of color dropped to 7% for girls of color from families 
with a median family income of between $50,001 and $65,000, while the 
participation rate of Caucasian girls increased from 18% to 23%.  Although the 
participation rate of girls of color from families in the highest family income 
range, $65,001 and higher, surged back up to 13%, the participation rate of 
Caucasian girls also increased significantly to 38%—25%higher than girls of 
color. 
The participation rate for Caucasian boys when compared to boys of color 
portrayed a different picture than that for Caucasian girls, in Figure 6.2 below.  
The participation rate of Caucasian boys was only significantly greater than 
boys of color for families with a median income of between $50,001 and 
$65,000.  In that income range, the participation rate for Caucasian boys highly 
involved in sports was 36%, double that of boys of color, which was 18%.  At 
the lowest family income range, $35,000 or lower, the participation rate for boys 
of color was 5% higher than Caucasian boys.  At the $35,001 to $50,000 family 
income range, the participation rate for boys of color was 11% higher than 
Caucasian boys.  Finally, at the highest family income range, $65,001 or higher, 
 
100. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 19. 
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the participation rate increased to 40% for Caucasian boys, but that rate is only 
6% higher than boys of color. 
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The participation gender gap, displayed in Figure 6.3 below, persisted at all 
median income categories, although at the highest median household income 
level, where Caucasian girls participated in sports 2% less than Caucasian boys, 
the participation gap narrowed.  Girls of color from families with family income 
of $65,001 or more were 21% less likely to participate in sports at a high level 
than boys of color.  As one considers the other family income levels, the story 
is much different.  Caucasian boys were 10% more likely than Caucasian girls 
to be highly involved in sports where family income was $35,000 or below.  As 
the median family income increased to between $35,001 and $50,000, the 
gender gap decreased to 9%, so that Caucasian girls were 9% less likely than 
Caucasian boys to be highly involved in sports.  When family income was 
between $50,001 and $65,000, 13% more Caucasian boys than girls were highly 
involved in sports.  However, as mentioned above, the gender gap narrowed 
again at median family income of $65,001 or more.  At the highest median 
income range, Caucasian girls were 2% less likely than Caucasian boys to be 
highly involved in sports.  It appears that for Caucasian girls, Title IX is working 
for at least girls who—although still 2% lower than Caucasian boys—come 
from families with median family incomes of $65,001 and greater, because the 
participation gap for Caucasian girls was at its lowest level by 2% less than the 
participation rate of Caucasian boys. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101. See id. 
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The gender participation gap for girls and boys of color from families 
earning $35,000 or less did not show significant variance from the gender 
participation gap between Caucasian boys and girls.  At that family income 
level, there was a participation gender gap of 10% for children of color: 10% 
more boys of color are highly involved in sports at this median family income 
group than girls.  Girls of color whose families’ median family income was 
between $35,001 and $50,000 and were highly involved in sports, participate in 
sport at a rate of 16%—2% lower than Caucasian girls.  However, as Figure 6.3 
illustrates, although the gender participation gap between Caucasian girls and 
boys was only 9%, the gender participation gap between boys and girls of color 
more than doubled that of Caucasian girls and boys: 22% more boys of color 
than girls of color were highly involved in sports, where their median family 
income was between $35,001 and $50,000. 
The gender participation gap of boys and girls of color was only 11% for 
children from families with a median family income between $50,001 and 
$65,000.  That is, at the $50,001 to $65,000 median family income range, 11% 
more boys of color were highly involved in sports than girls of color.  The 
participation gender gap between Caucasian boys and girls was slightly higher 
at 13%; 13% more Caucasian boys were highly involved in sports than 
Caucasian girls. 
There was a significant disparity between the participation rate of girls of 
color and Caucasian girls whose median family income was $65,001 or higher.  
Figure 6.1 shows that although the participation rate for girls of color almost 
doubled to 13% at family income of $65,001 or higher, the participation rate for 
Caucasian girls grew to 38% at this income level.  Although gender parity was 
achieved (or at least close to) for Caucasian girls in the highest income range, 
this was not the case for girls of color.  There is almost no gender gap for 
Caucasian girls at the highest income bracket.  Caucasian girls highly involved 
 
102. See id. 
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in sports participated at a rate that was only 2% lower than Caucasian boys.  
Girls of color, on the other hand, participated at a rate that was 21% lower than 
boys of color. 
The fact that, as family income increased, the sports participation rate of 
girls of color decreased, was unexpected.  It is not clear why the gender gap 
virtually disappeared for Caucasian girls as family income reached its highest 
level in the survey and not for girls of color.103 
7.   The Community Where 3rd–through-12th-Grade Girls Live Influences 
Their Nonparticipating Rate in Sporting Activities 
Studying the rate at which girls and boys are not participating in sports—
the nonparticipation rate—gives us a glimpse of their interests in sports and 
physical activities.  If the nonparticipation rate is noted to be greater for one 
group—minority and urban girls as compared to suburban girls or rural girls—
the higher nonparticipation rate means that more members of that group are not 
participating in sporting activities and should prompt us to consider factors 
contributing to the rate differential.  If there is any hope of achieving minority 
gender equity under Title IX, strategic efforts must be made to reduce the 
number of minority girls, girls from urban communities, and girls from 
economically disadvantaged communities who were not participating in sports, 
by developing strategies for increasing participating opportunities in emerging 
and formerly designated NCAA emerging women’s sports. 
It is reasonable to conclude from the Go Out and Play study that urban 
communities consist predominantly of minority groups.104  The percentages of 
girls from urban communities that were not participating in sports were at their 
highest points at two grade levels: the first was in the 3rd grade through 5th 
grade, and again in the 9th-through-12th grades.  The study revealed, as 
displayed in Figure 7.1 below, that 41% of urban girls in both the 3rd-through-
5th grades and the 9th-through-12th grades were not involved in sports 
activities.  The nonparticipation rate of urban girls at these two grade levels was 
higher than both girls and boys from suburban105 and rural106 communities.  
 
103. The answer to this question is worth further investigation. 
104. See generally GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43. 
105. Only 19% of suburban girls in the 3rd-through-5th grades and 31% in the 9th-through-12the 
were not involved in sports; whereas, the percent of suburban boys not involved in sports was 11% in 
the 3rd-through-5th grades and 29% for the 9th-through-12th grades.  Compare infra Figure 7.1 with 
infra Figure 7.2. 
106. Only 26% of girls from rural communities do not participate in sports at the 3rd-through-8th 
grades, while that figure increases to 35% in the 9th-through-12th grades; however, although the figure 
for boys from rural communities who do not participate in sports in the 3rd-through-5th grades is higher 
than boys from both urban and suburban communities at 31%, and that figure increases by only 3% for 
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Girls from suburban communities show their lowest percent of non-involvement 
in sports during the 3rd through 5th grades at 19%.  The percentages of girls 
from suburban and rural communities that were not involved in sports in the 
9th-through-12th grades, although lower than urban girls, were relatively close 
to each other: 31% for suburban girls and 35% for rural girls.  Rural girls did 
not fare much better than urban girls.  Other than minority girls, rural girls 
represented girls with the next highest rate of nonparticipation during the 3rd-
through-5th grades at 26%. 
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In these formative ages, where sport participation is critical, urban girls in 
the 3rd-through-5th grades had a nonparticipation rate that was much higher rate 
than girls and boys from urban, suburban, and rural communities.  The earlier 
an athlete begins participating in sport, the more proficient that athlete becomes 
in sports as they mature.108  The increase in the nonparticipation rate for urban 
girls noted in the 3rd-through-5th grades was repeated again in the 9th-through-
12th grades—the grades during which potential collegiate female student-
athletes were recruited to participate in traditional, emerging, and formerly 
designated NCAA emerging women’s sports at the collegiate level.109 
Interestingly enough, however, unlike suburban girls and girls from rural 
communities, where the nonparticipation rate gradually increased from the 3rd-
through-12th grades, the nonparticipating rate of urban girls dropped to 22%—
 
rural boys in the 9th-through-12th grades to 34%.  Id. 
107. See generally GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 13. 
108. Heart of the Game, supra note 5, at 201.  The authors’ stated the following: 
For purposes of increasing young women’s access to athletics, a focus on sports opportunities in college 
is too late, particularly in the increasingly competitive environment for women’s intercollegiate sports 
where there are very few opportunities for female college athletes to “walk on” to sports.  It takes years 
and years of competitive play to have the necessary skill to take advantage of the sports opportunities 
Title IX has created at the college level. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
109. See generally id. 
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its lowest level—just before urban girls enter high school—6th-through-8th 
grades.  The nonparticipation rate of urban girls in the 6th-through-8th grades 
fell below the nonparticipation rates of both suburban and rural girls.  The 
nonparticipation rates of suburban and rural girls in the 6th-through-8th grades 
was 30% and 31%, respectively.110  The nonparticipation rate for urban girls in 
the 6th-through-8th grades was also lower than the nonparticipation rate for 
urban boys at 24% and rural boys at 29%. 
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The data demonstrates that girls from urban and minority communities are 
interested in playing sports.  As the nonparticipation rate for minority and urban 
girls at the middle school level decreased, there was a corresponding increase, 
over girls from other communities, in the sports participation rate of urban girls 
moderately involved in athletics.  Figure 7.3 below shows that while 54% of 
urban girls surveyed were moderately involved in sports—6% higher than 
suburban and rural girls that were moderately involved in sporting activities—
both suburban and rural girls participate at a 48% rate.  As demonstrated below 
in Figure 9.1, when the participation rate of urban girls that were highly 
involved in sports during middle school—6th-through-8th grade—is compared 
to girls from both suburban and rural communities, a similar trend is seen.  The 
participation rate of urban middle school girls that were highly involved in 
sports was 24%, while the participation rate for suburban and rural girls was at 
22% and 21%, respectively.  Figure 9.1 below also demonstrates that during 
high school the participation rates of urban, suburban, and rural girls highly 
involved in sports clustered between 12% and 15%: rural girls at 15%, suburban 
girls at 14%, and urban girls at 12%. 
 
 
 
110. Of the suburban girls surveyed, 30% are not involved in sports, while 31% of rural girls are 
not involved in sports. 
111. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 14. 
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The problem, however, for urban girls and minority girls is that participation 
opportunities in emerging sports are virtually unavailable in their 
communities.113  Therefore, while Title IX is achieving gender equity by 
increasing participation opportunities in emerging and formerly designated 
NCAA emerging sports, minority girls and girls from urban, rural, and 
economically disadvantaged communities are not receiving the benefits 
promised by Title IX because those participation opportunities are not 
reasonably available in those communities.114 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               115 
 
112. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 13. 
113. See A. Jerome Dees, Do the Right Thing: A Search for an Equitable Application of Title IX 
in Historically Black Colleges and University Athletics, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 266 (2004) (“These 
emerging sports have been dubbed country club sports by a number of critics.  Minority leaders blame 
college administrators for what they call a poor selection of sports in their attempt to try to comply with 
Title IX.  The former NCAA chairman of the Minority Opportunity Committee stated that the selected 
sports are ‘traditionally very white, middle class sports . . . exclusive to people of color.’  The athletic 
opportunities created by these sports have resulted in few additional opportunities for black women, 
the core constituents of HBCUs.  The ol’ girls network now in place has white women at the controls 
of women’s athletics and black women on the outside of the process; for white women power and 
opportunity is concentrated in their hands while black women are clustered into track and basketball.” 
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); Brian L. Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst 
for an Alternate Model of College Sports, 8 SETON HALL. J. SPORT L. 351, 382 (1998) (“African-
American women do not benefit as much as white women do from the establishment of women’s 
college teams in ‘emerging’ sports because those sports, such as soccer, lacrosse, and softball, are 
popular in white suburban and rural communities, but are not popular in urban communities, where 
many African-American women live.” (footnote omitted)). 
114. Id. 
115. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 14. 
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8.   Participation Rate of Girls in Grades 3–12 Moderately Involved in Sports 
Is Influenced by Community Location, Economic Disparities, Race, 
Ethnicity, and Family Characteristics 
Much of the focus for closing the gender gap in collegiate sports has been 
at the collegiate level, and rightly so.  However, closing the gender gap for 
minority girls, girls from urban and rural communities will require cultivating 
fertile ground much earlier in the lives of girls, and boys, for that matter, than 
at the collegiate level.  Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 above examined statistics for 
girls and boys moderately involved in sports.  Unlike urban girls, Figure 7.3 
confirmed a steady increase in the percent of suburban girls moderately engaged 
in sports beginning in the 3rd-through-5th grades and continuing through high 
school (9th-through-12th grades).  In the 3rd-through-5th grades, 46% of 
suburban girls surveyed were moderately involved in sports.  That number 
increased to 55% by the 9th-through-12th grades.116  The highest percent of 
girls surveyed who indicated moderate participation in sports was for rural girls 
in the 3rd-through-5th grades at 54%.117  The percent of rural girls moderately 
participating in sports dropped to 48% in the 6th-through-8th grades, before 
increasing again to 51% in their high school years. 
The trends in participation rates for urban girls who were moderate sports 
participants indicate that these girls may offer a potential population for 
narrowing the minority gender equity gap between urban girls and the gender 
gap between girls from both suburban and rural communities.  The percentage 
of urban girls surveyed who were moderately engaged in sports was 47% in the 
3rd-through-5th grades, and was slightly higher than the participation rate for 
suburban girls who were at 46%.  The participation rate for urban girls 
moderately involved in sports peaked in middle school at 54% and dropped 
slightly to 48% in the high school grades.  The participation rate of urban girls 
moderately involved in sports during the 9th-through-12th grades was lower 
than both girls living in rural and suburban communities. 
The participation rate for urban boys in the 3rd-through-5th grade who were 
moderately involved in sports was 48%—higher than the participation rate of 
rural boys in the same grades at 42% and that of suburban boys at 39%.  The 
participation rate for urban boys in the 6th-through-8th grades moderately 
involved in sports dropped to 39%, which was below the participation rates for 
rural boys at 43% and suburban boys at 42%.  As Figure 7.4 demonstrates, much 
 
116. A similar phenomenon was seen with suburban boys moderately involved in sports, where 
there is a steady increase in participation from 39% in grades three through five to 49% for 9th through 
12th grade boys.  See supra Figure 7.4. 
117. The participation rate for rural boys in the same grade range was in between the participation 
rate for urban boys at 48% and that of suburban boys at 39%. 
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like urban girls, the participation rate for urban boys in the 9th-through-12th 
grades who were moderately involved in sports at 43% was lower than any other 
group.118  The participation rate for suburban boys in the 9th-through-12th 
grades at 49% was the highest of all communities studied, including boys from 
rural communities at 46%. 
The gender gap statistics depicted in Figure 8.1 demonstrate that, except for 
urban boys and girls in the 3rd-through-5th grades, at all other grade levels, girls 
that were moderately involved in sports were participating, regardless of the 
community in which they live, at a greater rate than boys—there was no gender 
gap at these grade levels.  The gender gap for girls from rural communities 
declined from its highest levels at 12% in the 3rd-through-5th grade; girls from 
rural communities particitated at a moderate level at 12% more than boys from 
the same community.  In the 6th-through-8th grades, rural girls were only 5% 
more likely than boys to be moderately involved in sports.  The gender gap for 
girls from suburban communities who were moderately involved in sports 
dropped to zero in the 9th-through-12th grades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                   119 
The gender gap between 3rd-through-5th-grade boys and girls from urban 
communites who reported that they were moderately involved in sports was 
only 1%—only 1% more boys than girls from urban communities moderately 
participated in sports.  The participation rate for girls from urban communities 
decreased to -15%, meaning that 15% more urban girls than urban boys were 
moderately involved in sports in the 6th-through-8th grades.  A similar trend in 
the gender gap was demonstrated for girls and boys from suburban and rural 
communities in the 6th-through-8th grades; 5% more rural girls and 6% more 
suburban girls were moderately involved in sports than boys from those 
respective communities.  The sports participation rate of girls from urban, 
surburban, and rural communities that were moderately involved in sports, both 
prior to and in the 9th-through-12th grades, suggests fertile ground for achieving 
 
118. Compare supra Figure 7.3 with supra Figure 7.4. 
119. See GO OUT AND PLAY, supra note 43, at 13–14. 
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gender equity across a broader identity spectrum, and should forecast better 
participation opportunities and gender equity gains for all girls highly involved 
in sports during the 9th-through-12th grades. 
9.   What Happens to Sports Participation Opportunity Gains for Girls Highly 
Involved in Sports by 12th Grade 
Figure 9.1 demonstrates that urban girls in the 3rd-through-5th grades 
surveyed who indicated they were highly involved in sports had the lowest 
participation rate of girls from all communities at 11%.  However, much as was 
the case with urban girls who were moderately engaged in sports; in the 6th-
through-8th grades, the participation rate for urban girls doubled to 24% and 
was higher than girls from all other communities.  In the 3rd-through-5th grades, 
girls from suburban communities who were highly involved in sports had the 
highest participation rate of girls from all communities at 36%.  There was, 
however, a precipitous drop in the participation rate of suburban girls highly 
involved in sports, from 36% in the 3rd-through-5th grades to 22% for girls 
from suburban communities in 6th-through-8th grade.  The participation rate of 
rural girls surveyed who were highly involved in sports had a participation rate 
of 20% in the 3rd-through-5th grades; however, the participation rate only 
increased by 1% to 21% in the 6th-through-8th grades.  By the 9th-through-12th 
grades, however, rural girls who were highly involved in sports participated at 
a higher level of participation at 15% than both suburban girls at 14%, and urban 
girls at 12%. 
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A gender gap existed when the participation rates of boys highly involved 
in sports were compared to girls at all grades levels, as displayed in Figure 9.3 
below.  The participation rate for suburban boys in the 3rd-through-5th grades 
at 51% was 15% higher than suburban girls in the same grades.  The difference 
between the participation rates of urban boys at 33% and urban girls highly 
 
120. See id. at 13. 
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Figure 9.3:  Gender Gap High Involved and Community 
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involved in sports displayed a greater gender gap of 22%—22% more urban 
boys than urban girls in 3rd-through-5th grades were participating in sports at 
the highest level.  However, there was only a 7% difference between the 
participation rates of rural boys at 27% and rural girls at 20% in the 3rd-through-
5th grades.  Seven percent more rural boys than rural girls were participating in 
sports at the highest level in the 3rd-through-5th grades. 
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The gender gap between girls and boys highly involved in sports was still 
apparent in the 6th-through-8th grades for girls from all communities.  It is 
apparent that at these grades, suburban and urban girls were losing the 
participation game to suburban and urban boys.  The participation rate for 
suburban boys was 17% higher than the participation rate of suburban girls in 
6th-through-8th grades.  However, the gender gap for urban boys and girls was 
at 14%.  The participation rate of highly involved rural boys was 7% higher than 
the participation rate of rural girls. 
It is clear that in high school, urban girls are falling behind all groups as far 
as the participation gender gap is concerned.  The gender gap narrowed between 
suburban boys and girls in the 9th-through-12th grades.  The participation rate 
for suburban boys was 8% higher than the participation rate for suburban girls.  
 
121. See id. at 14. 
122. See id. at 13–14. 
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The gender gap narrowed even more when the participation rates of rural boys 
were compared to those of rural girls.  The participation rate for rural boys was 
only 5% higher than rural girls.  The gender gap was at its highest rate, however, 
between urban boys and girls, with urban boys participating at a rate 13% 
greater than urban girls.  Clearly, more work needs to done to bridge the gender 
gap between girls and boys from all communities, particularly the gender gap 
between girls and boys from urban communities. 
IV.  HARVESTING TITLE IX TO ENHANCE PARTICIPATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
GIRLS FROM MINORITY, ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED, URBAN, AND 
SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES 
Caucasian female student-athletes are flourishing because of participation 
opportunities available through emerging sports, while African-American, 
Hispanic, Asian, and other minority female student-athletes are consistently 
denied the access to participation opportunity benefits Title IX was enacted to 
confer.  Girls from minority, urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged 
communities have such limited access to emerging sports that their participation 
opportunities are virtually limited to traditional women’s sports and are 
essentially nonexistent with respect to emerging women’s sports.123  
Educational institutions that receive federal funds, which recognize these 
inequities and turn a blind eye to them, may be liable under Title IX.124 
Title IX affirmatively obligates federal funds recipients to eliminate not 
only traditional intentional discrimination, but also known instances of 
“deliberate indifference” to inequities occurring within those institutions. The 
Supreme Court has developed an expanded intentional discrimination 
doctrine,125 as seen in the Supreme Court’s “deliberate indifference” 
jurisprudence that will provide a Title IX remedy for victims who lack access 
to sports participation opportunities in emerging women’s sports known to be 
created by institutional policy choices that perpetuate gender inequities 
experienced by minority girls, girls from urban, economically disadvantaged, 
and rural communities.126  Regardless, however, of their status as members of 
a racial minority group or members of other identity groups, “deliberate 
 
123. See Race and Gender Demographics Search Division I, supra note 6.  See also Lauren Smith, 
Black Female Participation Languishes Outside Basketball and Track, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 
29, 2007), http://chronicle.com/article/Black-Female-Participation/21449; Timothy Davis, Race and 
Sports in America: An Historical Overview, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 291, 309 (2008). 
124. See infra Part IV(A)(4). 
125. See generally Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s 
Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, 67 
MD. L. REV. 358, 379 (2008). 
126. See discussion infra Parts IV(A)(1)–(4). 
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indifference” of high school and middle school athletic decision makers, school 
districts, and state education administrators to whether their policy choices 
sustain gender inequities or undermine Congressional objectives Title IX was 
enacted to promote, constitutes actionable intentional discrimination.127 
A.  Traditional Intentional Discrimination Analysis Under Title IX Does Not 
Reach Conduct that Constitutes Disparate Impact Discrimination 
Unlike Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, Title VI and Title IX impose 
an affirmative obligation on programs receiving federal funds to remedy 
discrimination once officials become aware of the consequences of their 
programs or policies.128  In this section of the Article, I will examine the 
differences and similarities between application of intentional discrimination 
and “deliberate indifference” standards for assessing liability under Title IX and 
will argue, private cause of action aside, the obligation to provide equal access 
to sports participation opportunities exists for educational institutions that 
receive federal funds.  Therefore, programs whose administration or policies 
deny equal access to sports participation opportunities are vulnerable to losing 
federal funding if they do not act to correct the problem.  They should also be 
vulnerable to private action once responsible program officials are aware of the 
effects of their programs or policy decisions and remain “deliberately 
indifferent” to the programs’ effects.129 
To begin my analysis, I will analyze the Supreme Court’s intentional 
discrimination and disparate impact jurisprudence under the Equal Protection 
Clause, Title VI, and Title IX and will apply the Court’s “deliberate 
indifference” analysis, developed under the Supreme Court’s sexual harassment 
cases, to gender equity claims and claims of denial of access to sports 
participation opportunities under Title IX.  Application of the Court’s 
“deliberate indifference” doctrine to gender equity claims and claims of denial 
of access to sports programs under Title IX will enable advocates of gender 
equity to achieve gender equity under Title IX for minority girls, girls from 
urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities. 
1.   Intentional Discrimination and Race Under the Equal Protection Clause 
The standard applied in determining whether actions taken constitute 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution 
 
127. See discussion infra Parts IV(A)(1)–(4). 
128. See Black, supra note 125, at 402–03; see also discussion infra Part IV(A)(1)–(3). 
129. See infra notes Parts IV(A)(1)–(4). 
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was articulated by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis.130  The case 
involved two African-American (then called Negros) police officers who filed 
suit against the Commissioners of the United States Civil Service Commission, 
the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, and the Chief of the District’s 
Metropolitan Police Department asserting that promotion policies of the police 
department were racially discriminatory because of the policies’ disparate 
impact on African-American applicants.131  In reaching its decision that, absent 
purposeful discrimination, disparate impact is not sufficient to establish 
intentional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court chronicled its historical approach to intentional 
discrimination.132 
Starting with the Supreme Court’s 1880 decision in Strauder v. West 
Virginia, the Washington Court reasoned that, although Strauder “established 
that the exclusion of all Negroes from grand and petit juries in criminal” cases 
would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the fact that a 
particular jury is not statistically representative of the community—without 
more—is not sufficient to establish “invidious discrimination.”133  The 
purposeful intent to exclude members of a particular race from jurymen, 
although the sine quo non of establishing intentional discrimination, may be 
proven by showing a systemic exclusion of eligible members of the particular 
race from jury pools or by unequal application of the law to members of that 
race.134 
The Washington Court continued its examination of the historical standard 
employed in determining intentional discrimination.  The Court examined how 
the standard had been applied in the context of legislative redistricting, where 
the Court had previously upheld a New York apportionment statue against a 
claim that redistricting lines were “racially gerrymandered.”135  The statute was 
upheld even though, as a result of the redistricting, the districts that were 
 
130. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  Although the case involved the Equal Protection under the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, the Supreme Court indicated that the standard applied in Equal 
Protection cases under the Fourteenth Amendment is not different than would be applied under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 239. 
131. Id. at 232. 
132. Id. at 239. 
133. Id. (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)). 
134. The Washington Court stated, “A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be 
proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application of 
the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination.”  Id. at 239 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 
325 U.S. 398, 403–404 (1945). 
135. Id. at 240 (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964)). 
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challenged were rendered either predominantly white or minority districts.136  
The Court upheld the statute because the challenger failed to demonstrate that 
the legislature, when the statute was enacted, was motivated by race or that the 
legislature intentionally drew the districts along racial lines.137 
The Washington Court next considered the school desegregation cases, in 
which the Supreme Court adhered to the equal protection principle that 
discrimination must be traced to a “racially discriminatory purpose.”138  The 
Equal Protection Clause is not violated, the Court commented, simply because 
there are predominantly black and white schools in a community.139  According 
to the Court, there must be intentional state action to segregate or a state purpose 
to segregate.140 
In support of its claim that intentional discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause meant more than disparate impact discrimination, the 
Washington Court recounted why its recent decision rejected a desperate impact 
discrimination claim, where the basis for the claim was an alleged racially 
discriminatory effect of certain provisions of the Social Security Act.141  
Holding that discrimination occurred simply because certain provisions of the 
Social Security Act have a statistically discriminatory effect on a racial group 
would, according to the Washington Court, render any differential treatment a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the absence of racial 
motivation and regardless of the legitimate rationale for such treatment.142 
This does not mean, however, that disparate impact discrimination can 
never be the basis for finding intentional discrimination or that disparate impact 
is irrelevant in determining intentional discrimination.143  The Court in 
 
136. Id. 
137. Id. (“[T]he plaintiffs had not shown that the statute ‘was the product of a state contrivance to 
segregate on the basis of race or place of origin.’” (quoting Wright, 376 U.S. at 58)). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. (“The essential element of de jure segregation is ‘a current condition of segregation 
resulting from intentional state action.’ . . . ‘The differentiating factor between de jure segregation and 
so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.’” (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 413 U.S. 189, 205, 208 (1973)). 
141. Id. at 240–41 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972)). 
142. Id. (reiterating that “[t]he Court has also recently rejected allegations of racial discrimination 
based solely on the statistically disproportionate racial impact of various provisions of the Social 
Security Act because ‘[t]he acceptance of appellants’ constitutional theory would render suspect each 
difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however 
otherwise rational the treatment might be.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 548 
(1972)). 
143. Id. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an 
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.  Standing alone, it does not trigger the 
rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the 
FERGUSON ARTICLE  - FORMATTED FINAL 6/4/2014  4:07 PM 
392 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:2 
Washington signaled that Yick Wo v. Hopkins144 was an important illustration 
of this point.  The defendants in Yick Wo were incarcerated for violating a San 
Francisco City ordinance which made it unlawful to conduct a laundry business 
within the city and county without consent of the board of supervisors.145  
Laundries that were constructed of brick or stone were exempt from the 
statute.146  The defendants alleged that of the 320 laundries within the city and 
county of San Francisco, 240 were owned by persons of Chinese decent, and 
310 of the total were constructed of wood.147  Over 200 applicants of Chinese 
decent that had conducted their business for over twenty years who applied to 
the board of supervisors for a license were denied.148  Only one applicant that 
was not of Chinese decent was denied a license by the board of supervisors.149  
The Washington Court determined that the ruling in Yick Wo was one example 
of a context in which the disparate impact of a statute on persons of Chinese 
decent was evidence that the board of supervisors committed intentional 
discrimination in its application of a neutral statute.150 
The Supreme Court’s rulings addressing racial discrimination in a series of 
jury selection cases provided a second example of disparate impact 
discrimination, based on racial statistical disparities, was proof of intentional 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.151  The Washington 
Court observed that the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from juries 
demonstrated intentional discrimination resulting from asymmetrical 
application of the law.152  A plaintiff could make out a prima facie case for 
intentional discrimination by showing, in addition to the absence of African-
Americans on a particular jury, proof that the jury commissioners were never 
informed of the number of African-Americans in a community that were eligible 
to serve on the jury or that the jury selection process that was not racially 
neutral.153 
The Supreme Court applied its ruling in Washington, a Fifth Amendment 
 
weightiest of considerations.” (citation omitted)). 
144. Id. at 241 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
145. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357. 
146. Id. at 358. 
147. Id. at 358–59. 
148. Id. at 359. 
149. Id. 
150. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, 
must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race.” (citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 
373–74)). 
151. Id. at 241. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
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case, to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.154  In affirming its 
decision in Washington, the Arlington Heights Court observed that the 
unconstitutionality of an official zoning board will not be judged solely on 
whether its action resulted in disproportionate impact on a racial group.155  
Although not irrelevant, the Court noted, racially disproportionate impact “is 
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.”156  The Court 
found that the parties failed to carry the burden, proving that the Village of 
Arlington Heights was motivated by a discriminatory purpose in its decision to 
deny rezoning and, therefore, ended the Court’s constitutional inquiry.157 
2.   Intentional Discrimination and Gender Under the Equal Protection Clause 
In Personnel v. Feeney, the Supreme Court examined whether the 
intentional discrimination standard applicable to race cases under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States would be similarly applied to sex 
discrimination claims.158  The plaintiff—Helen Feeney—was not a veteran.159  
During her twelve-year tenure as a state employee for the state of 
Massachusetts, Helen Feeney had scored well on competitive civil service 
examinations.160  However, because of Massachusetts’s veterans’ preference 
statute, male veterans who scored lower than her were always ranked higher 
than her for civil service positions.161  As a result, the preference granted males 
an immense advantage over females.162  The plaintiff challenged the veterans’ 
 
154. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
155. Id. at 264–65. 
156. Id. at 264–65 (The Court made it clear that the intentional discrimination standard it 
established in Washington applied to the Fourteenth Amendment, by stating, “Our decision last Term 
in Washington v. Davis made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because 
it results in a racially disproportionate impact.  ‘Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not 
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.’  Proof of racially discriminatory intent or 
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. 
at 242 (citation omitted))). 
157. Id. at 270–71 (“Respondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village’s decision.  This conclusion ends the constitutional 
inquiry.  The court of Appeals’ further finding that the Village’s decision carried a discriminatory 
‘ultimate effect’ is without independent constitutional significance.” (footnote omitted)). 
158. 442 U.S. 256, 267 (1979)  (“The present case is apparently the first to challenge the 
Massachusetts veterans' preference on the simple ground that it discriminates on the basis of sex.”). 
159. Id. at 256. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. at 257–58.  The preference applied to the state of Massachusetts’s classified civil 
service position, which represented 60% of the state’s public jobs.  Id. at 261–62.  “Although the 
veterans’ preference thus does not guarantee that a veteran will be appointed, it is obvious that the 
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preference statute on the ground that the preference, which required state 
governmental employers to consider veterans who served during a war ahead of 
nonveterans, violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.163 
In reaching its decision that the Massachusetts statute passed Equal 
Protection scrutiny, the Court acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not strip states of all power of classification.164  All laws classify, the Court 
acknowledged, so long as rationally based, the fact that legislative 
classifications unevenly impact certain groups, normally raises no constitutional 
concerns.165  In evaluating the constitutionality of such a state classification, the 
concern is the validity of the classification and not the legislature’s wisdom in 
enacting the law, so long as there is no reason to infer hostility on the part of the 
legislature.166 
Before addressing the standard it would apply in determining whether the 
Massachusetts statute discriminated on the basis of gender, the Court reviewed 
the constitutional standard applied in determining race discrimination claims 
under the Equal Protection Clause.167  Racial classifications, the Court 
 
preference gives to veterans who achieve passing scores a well-nigh absolute advantage.”  Id. at 264.  
Further, historically Massachusetts sought to insure that women veterans were covered by the statutory 
preference for veterans: 
  Notwithstanding the apparent attempts by Massachusetts to include as many military women as 
possible within the scope of the preference, the statute today benefits an overwhelmingly male class.  This 
is attributable in some measure to the variety of federal statutes, regulations, and policies that have restricted 
the number of women who could enlist in the United States Armed Forces, and largely to the simple fact 
that women have never been subjected to a military draft. 
Id. at 269–70 (footnote omitted). 
163. See id. at 259.  Plaintiff’s case was consolidated with a case filed by Carol A. Anthony, an 
attorney, whose efforts to secure a position as a Civil Service Counsel I were similarly frustrated.  Id. 
at 259 n.3.  Over the objections of the defendants—state officials—the Attorney General of 
Massachusetts appealed to the Supreme Court who certified for decision of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts whether the Attorney General may appeal the matter over the objections of state 
officials-defendants.  Id.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in favor of the Attorney 
General.  Id.  The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for 
reconsideration in light of its decision in Washington v. Davis: that without purposeful discrimination, 
the Equal Protection Clause of Fifth Amendment is not violated simply because the statute had a 
disparate impact on racial groups.  Id. at 281.  On remand the District Court ruled the statute violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth amendment, because the disparate effect of the statute 
was too inevitable to be unintended.  Id. at 260–61. 
164. Id. at 271. 
165. Id. at 272 (“The calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a 
society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.”). 
166. Id. (“When some other independent right is not at stake, and when there is no ‘reason to infer 
antipathy,’ it is presumed that ‘even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the 
democratic process . . . .’” (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (citations omitted)). 
167. See id. at 271–72. 
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recapped, are presumptively invalid and would be upheld only upon an 
“extraordinary justification.”168  The same is true for a neutral statute that is an 
apparent pretext for racial discrimination.169  The Court made clear, however, 
that even a neutral statute that has a disproportionate impact on minority groups 
will not be struck down unless the impact is traceable to a racially 
discriminatory purpose.170  Classifications based on gender, according to the 
Court, are afforded similar treatment under Equal Protection analysis.171 
The question the Court considered in applying its Equal Protection 
precedent was whether the system of classification instituted by the 
Massachusetts statute was based, plainly or surreptitiously, on gender.172  The 
Court accepted plaintiff’s concession in the case that the statute was neutral on 
its face.173  The Court also agreed with the District Court’s determination that 
the statute served a legitimate purpose and that the preference was not 
established for the purpose of discriminating against women.174  The Court 
signaled, as it did in its race cases to which its Equal Protection analysis applied, 
that gender impact alone could establish discriminatory purpose, if there was 
not a plausible neutral ground for the classification system established by the 
statute.175 
However, comprehension of the inevitable impact of the veterans’ 
preference statute on women is not intentional discrimination for constitutional 
 
168. Id. at 272. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 273 (“[P]recedents dictate that any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males 
over females in public employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand 
a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
172. Id. at 274. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 274–75 (“The [plaintiff] has thus acknowledged and the District Court has thus found 
that the distinction between veterans and nonveterans drawn by [the statute] is not a pretext for gender 
discrimination.  The [plaintiff]’s concession and the District Court’s finding are clearly correct.”). 
175. Id. at 275.  The Court stated, 
Apart from the facts that the definition of “veterans” in the statute has always been neutral as to gender and 
that Massachusetts has consistently defined veteran status in a way that has been inclusive of women who 
have served in the military, this is not a law that can plausibly be explained only as a gender-based 
classification. 
. . . . 
Just as there are cases in which impact alone can unmask an invidious classification, there are others, in 
which—notwithstanding impact—the legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law cannot be missed.  This is 
one.  The distinction made by [the statute] is, as it seems to be, quite simply between veterans and 
nonveterans, not between men and women. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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purposes.176  The statute violates the Equal Protection Clause if it was enacted 
to serve a discriminatory purpose, but does not violate the Constitution because 
of its disproportionate impact on women.177  The statute’s disparate impact may 
raise an inference that discrimination may be in play, but an inference that 
discrimination may exist is not proof of intentional discrimination.178 
3.   Intentional Discrimination Under Title IX and Title VI 
Without a private right of action under Title IX and Title VI, enforcement 
of and impositions of penalties for discrimination in violation of the respective 
statutes would be limited to withholding of or denial of federal funds.179 
i.   Private Right of Action Title IX 
Courts180 and commentators181 have recognized that Title VI and Title IX 
are coextensive.  Analysis of Title VI and Title IX, therefore, will proceed 
simultaneously.  The Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago, in 
determining whether a private right of action existed to recover damages or seek 
injunctive relief under Title IX, analyzed why decisions under Title VI were 
relied on to determine the question of whether a private right of action existed 
under Title IX. 182  The plaintiff, Geraldine Cannon, alleged in her complaint 
that, although she was qualified to attend both the University of Chicago and 
Northwestern Medical schools—based on her grade point average and her 
 
176. Id. at 279.  The Court reasoned, 
  “Discriminatory purpose,” however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences.  It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.  Yet nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally 
devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a 
stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 279 n.25 (“But in this inquiry—made as it is under the Constitution—an inference is a 
working tool, not a synonym for proof.  When, as here, the impact is essentially an unavoidable 
consequence of a legislative policy that has in itself always been deemed to be legitimate, and when, as 
here, the statutory history and all of the available evidence affirmatively demonstrate the opposite, the 
inference simply fails to ripen into proof.”). 
179. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 638–39 (1999).  See generally Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
180. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2005); see also Grove City 
Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514 (1982); 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694–99 (1979). 
181. Black, supra note 125, at 365. 
182. See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677. 
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medical school examination scores—she was denied admission because of her 
gender.183  Both medical schools admitted candidates that were less qualified 
than her.184  Ms. Cannon claimed that because both institutions had policies 
against admitting applicants over the age of thirty—unless they had advanced 
degrees—these institutions discriminated against women.185  Since women 
have higher incidences of interrupted higher education, the policies had a 
disproportionate and discriminatory impact on women.186 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision that Ms. Cannon had no private right of action against the 
defendants.187  The Court determined that—for the sake of argument, the 
defendants admitted certain facts in their motion to dismiss—only two facts 
were relevant to its resolution of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling.188  First, Ms. 
Cannon was excluded from admission to the respective medical schools because 
of her sex.189  Second, each institution received federal funds.190  The admitted 
facts, according to the Supreme Court, established “a violation of § 901 (a) of 
Title IX of the Education Amendments to the 1972.”191  The real question was 
whether Ms. Cannon could have brought an action to recover damages for the 
violations. 
In concluding that the Seventh Circuit’s decision was wrong, the Supreme 
 
183. Id. at 680–81 n.2. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 681 n.2 (Cannon contended that “[t]hese policies . . . prevented [her] from being asked 
to an interview at the medical schools, so that she was denied even the opportunity to convince the 
schools that her personal qualifications warranted her admission in place of persons whose objective 
qualifications were better than hers.”). 
186. Id. (Cannon claimed that both “the age and advanced-degree criteria operate to exclude 
women from consideration even though the criteria are not valid predictors of success in medical 
schools or in medical practice.  As such, the existence of the criteria either makes out or evidences a 
violation of the medical school’s duty under Title IX to avoid discrimination on the basis of sex.” 
(citation omitted)). 
187. Id. at 685–86.  According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he Court of Appeals agreed that the 
statute did not contain an implied private remedy.  Noting that § 902 of Title IX establishes a procedure 
for the termination of federal financial support for institutions violating § 901, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that Congress intended that remedy to be the exclusive means of enforcement.”  Id. at 683–
84. 
188. Id. at 680. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id.  Shortly after the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976.  Id. at 685.  The amendment authorized attorneys’ fee awards to the winning 
party in a Title IX enforcement action.  Id.  The Court of Appeals granted a petition to rehear the case 
in light of the passage of the Civil Right Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.  Id. at 685–86.  On 
rehearing, the court ruled that the Act did not intend to create a new right of action, where one did not 
exist.  Id. 
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Court carefully reviewed the four factors laid down in Cort v. Ash that, if 
satisfied, would indicate Congressional intent to create an implied private right 
of action.192  The first factor, whether the plaintiff was a member of the class 
Congress intended to benefit by enactment of Title IX, was answered in the 
affirmative by the Supreme Court.193  The second, the legislative history of Title 
IX, required the Cannon Court to look beyond the legislative history of Title IX 
and also consider the relationship of Title IX to Title VI and to other 
Congressional actions.194 
The Court concluded that where a federal right is created, it may not be 
necessary to demonstrate an intention to create a private right of action.195  
Under those circumstances, however, an explicit purpose to deny a private right 
of action would be controlling.196  Title IX’s history clearly demonstrated, 
however, that Congress did intend to create a private right of action. 
The Court chronicled the relationship between Title VI and Title IX to 
demonstrate that decisions under Title VI were relevant to its determination of 
whether Congress intended an implied private right of action under Title IX.197  
The Court first indicated that Title IX was patterned after Title VI.198  The 
legislative history of Title IX demonstrates that, except for substitution of the 
word “sex” for the words “race, color, or natural origin” in Title VI, the 
benefited class in both statutes was described using the identical language.199  
 
192. Id. at 688 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).  Those factors include 
[(1)] [I]s the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,’ that is, does the 
statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?  [(2)] [I]s there any indication of legislative intent, 
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?  [(3)] [I]s it consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?  [(4)] [I]s the cause of action 
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 
Id. at 688–89 n.9 (citations omitted) (quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)). 
193. Id. at 693–94 (“Unquestionably, therefore, the first of the four factors identified in Cort favors 
the implication of a private cause of action.  Title IX explicitly confers a benefit on persons 
discriminated against on the basis of sex, and petitioner is clearly a member of that class for whose 
special benefit the statute was enacted.”). 
194. Id. at 694 (“We must recognize, however, that the legislative history of a statute that does not 
expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the 
question.”). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. (“[I]n situations such as the present one ‘in which it is clear that federal law has granted a 
class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, 
although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling.’” (quoting Cort, 422 
U.S. at 82). 
197. Id. at 695–709. 
198. Id. at 694 (“Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”). 
199. Id. at 694–95. 
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The origin of Title IX also demonstrates its link with Title VI.  Although Title 
IX began as a house bill that would have added the word “sex” to the list of 
discriminatory conduct prohibited by Title VI, the house bill, which ultimately 
became Title IX, was taken out of Title VI—because Title IX’s focus was 
slightly more limited than that of Title VI.200  The administrative method for 
terminating federal funding for an institution engaged in discrimination 
prohibited under both Title IX and Title VI mirrored each other, and neither 
statute expressly provided for a private right of action for the benefited class.201 
When Title IX was enacted in 1972, according to the Cannon Court, Title 
VI had already been interpreted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to provide 
private right of action, an opinion that had been repeatedly cited with 
approval.202  Noting that a dozen federal courts had reached the same conclusion 
that Title VI provided for a private right of action, the Court ruled that it was 
justified in presuming that Congress intended a private right of action under 
Title IX.203  In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that both private 
citizens and Congressional representatives are presumed to know the state of 
the law.204  Further, repeated references by Congressional representatives to 
Title VI validated their intent that Title IX would be interpreted to provide for a 
private right of action.205  Finally, the Court determined that it was not necessary 
to rely on the presumption, because the language and history of the collection 
of statutes that Title IX was a part of, demonstrated that Congress understood 
that the private right of action that existed with respect to Title VI would also 
be found in its companion statute, Title IX.206 
Having concluded that the second factor established by the Cort decision 
was satisfied, that there was historical support for a private right of action under 
Title IX, the Cannon Court turned its attention to the third factor established by 
Cort: a prohibition against implying a private right of action, which “would 
 
200. Id. at 695 n.16 (“Although [the house bill] never made it through the House, its sex 
discrimination provision was lifted from it, modified along the lines suggested in the 1970 hearings, 
and included in the House Resolution that was amended and adopted by the House as its version of 
what became [Title IX].”). 
201. Id. at 696 (“The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied 
as Title VI had been during the preceding eight years.”). 
202. Id. at 696. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 696–97. 
205. Id. at 696–98 (“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other 
citizens, know the law; in this case, because of their repeated references to Title VI and its modes of 
enforcement, we are especially justified in presuming both that those representatives were aware of the 
prior interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their intent with respect to Title IX.”). 
206. Id. at 699. 
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frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme.”207  Title IX, like the 
statute it was modeled after, Title VI, was aimed at achieving two objectives: 
(1) preventing the use of federal funds to support discriminatory practices; and 
(2) affording protection to individual citizens against those discriminatory 
practices.208  The mechanism for achieving the first goal is found in the power 
to terminate the federal funding of institutions that discriminate on the bases of 
race (Title VI) or sex (Title IX).209  However, terminating federal funding, 
although austere, may not efficiently serve the needs of individuals who have 
been discriminated against.210  Affording protection to individual citizens 
against institutional discriminatory practices may be more effectively achieved 
by providing a private right of action to the party discriminated against.211 
The final factor under Cort is satisfied because implying a federal remedy 
in the form of a private right of action would be appropriate, since the subject 
matter is not one of state concern.212  Since the Civil War, the federal 
government and federal courts have been a powerful source of protection 
against discrimination, and it is the distribution of federal funds that provides 
justification for the statutory prohibition in the first place.213  Although Cannon 
resolved whether a private right of action existed under Title IX, the decision 
did not address the standard to be applied in determining whether discrimination 
has been proven. 
ii.   Private Right of Action Title VI 
As discussed above, when Title IX was enacted in 1972, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, had 
already interpreted Title VI to provide private right of action.214  The Bossier 
Parish School Board opinion had been repeatedly cited with approval.  Prior to 
 
207. Id. at 703. 
208. Id. at 704. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 705 (“[I]t makes little sense to impose on an individual, whose only interest is in 
obtaining a benefit for herself, or on HEW, the burden of demonstrating that an institution’s practices 
are so pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of federal funding is appropriate.”). 
211. Id. at 705–06 (“The award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted her 
own suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent with—and in some cases even necessary to—
the orderly enforcement of the statute.”). 
212. Id. at 708. 
213. Id. at 708–09 (“Moreover, it is the expenditure of federal funds that provides the justification 
for this particular statutory prohibition.  There can be no question but that this aspect of the Cort analysis 
supports the implication of a private federal remedy.”). 
214. See generally Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
388 U.S. 911 (1967); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.20. 
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the enactment of Title IX, lower courts had already determined that a private 
right of action existed under Title VI.215  The Supreme Court in Alexander v. 
Sandoval confirmed that a private right of action existed under Title VI.216 
The question before the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval was 
whether a private individual has a right to enforce agency regulations 
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination under Title VI.217  By accepting 
financial assistance from the United States Department of Justice and the 
Department of Transportation, the Alabama Department of Transportation 
subjected itself to Title VI’s restrictions, which prohibited the Alabama 
Department of Transportation from excluding anyone from its programs or 
activities on account of their race, color, or national origin.218  Before reaching 
its decision that no private right of action exists to enforce agency regulations 
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination under Section 602 of Title VI,219 
the Sandoval Court acknowledged that it was beyond dispute that a private 
individual may bring an action to recover damages and to seek injunctive relief 
under Section 601 of Title VI.220 
The Sandoval Court noted that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in 
Cannon v. University of Chicago (fully discussed above) was instructive.221  In 
Cannon, the Court acknowledged that Title VI and Title IX were equivalent 
enactments and that Congress had intended Title IX, like Title VI, to provide a 
private cause of action.222  The Sandoval Court concluded that Cannon 
“embraced the existence of a private right to enforce Title VI as well.”223  What 
was more significant, the Sandoval Court observed, was Congressional 
ratification of the holding in Cannon when Congress enacted Section 1003 of 
 
215. See id. 
216. 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001). 
217. Id. at 278. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 288 (“Section 602 authorizes federal agencies ‘to effectuate the provisions of [§ 601] 
. . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d–1 (2012)). 
220. Id. at 280–81 (“For purposes of the present case, however, it is clear from our decisions, from 
Congress's amendments of Title VI, and from the parties’ concessions that three aspects of Title VI 
must be taken as given.  First, private individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both 
injunctive relief and damages.” (footnote omitted)). 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 280 (“The reasoning of [the Cannon] decision embraced the existence of a private right 
to enforce Title VI as well.  ‘Title IX,’ the Court noted, ‘was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.’  And, ‘[i]n 1972 when Title IX was enacted, the [parallel] language in Title VI had already 
been construed as creating a private remedy.’  That meant, the Court reasoned, that Congress had 
intended Title IX, like Title VI, to provide a private cause of action.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694, 696 (1979)). 
223. Id. 
FERGUSON ARTICLE  - FORMATTED FINAL 6/4/2014  4:07 PM 
402 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:2 
the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986.224  That provision specifically 
eliminated the states’ sovereign immunity defense against action brought to 
enforce Title VI in federal court and provided for equitable and legal remedies 
for a private individual in such actions.225  Therefore, the Court reaffirmed that 
a private individual has a right to sue to enforce rights provided under Title 
VI.226 
The second aspect of Title VI that Sandoval recognized must be accepted 
as a given is that Section 601 of Title VI prohibits only intentional 
discrimination.227  Finally, the Sandoval Court recognized that regulations 
promulgated under Section 602 of Title VI228 may validly ban disparate impact 
discrimination, although the banned activities may be perfectly acceptable 
under Section 601.229  The activities banned under regulations authorized by 
Section 602—because the action has a disparate impact on protected racial 
 
224. Id. (“Congress has since ratified Cannon’s holding.  Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7, expressly abrogated States’ sovereign 
immunity against suits brought in federal court to enforce Title VI and provided that in a suit against a 
State ‘remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available . . . to the same extent as 
such remedies are available . . . in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.’” 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7(a)(2)). 
225. Id. (“We recognized in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, that [the amendment] 
‘cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon’s holding.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Franklin v. 
Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992))). 
226. Id. (“It is thus beyond dispute that private individuals may sue to enforce § 601.”). 
227. Id.  The Court traced it intentional discrimination jurisprudence beginning with Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, where the Supreme Court was asked to review “a decision of the California 
Supreme Court that had enjoined the University of California Medical School from ‘according any 
consideration to race in its admissions process.’”  Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 272 (1978)).  The Sandoval Court noted that “[e]ssential to the Court’s holding reversing that 
aspect of the California court’s decision was the determination that § 601 ‘proscribe[s] only those racial 
classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.’”  Id. at 280–
81 (alteration in original) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287).  The Sandoval Court then considered the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 
where “the Court made clear that under Bakke only intentional discrimination was forbidden by § 601.”  
Id. at 281 (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 610–11 (1983) 
(Powell, J., concurring)).  Finally, the Sandoval Court, stated that Alexander v. Choate “is true today: 
‘Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination.’”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985)). 
228. Section 602 of Title VI provides that: 
  Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to 
any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is 
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section [601] of this title with respect to such program 
or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with 
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which 
the action is taken. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1 (2012). 
229. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281. 
FERGUSON ARTICLE  - FORMATTED FINAL 6/4/2014  4:07 PM 
2014] GENDER EQUITY UNDER TITLE IX 403 
groups—are only enforceable by the federal funding agencies, and not by 
private individuals.230  The Sandoval Court, however, did not address whether 
the failure of a federal funds recipient to remedy disparate impact discrimination 
known to such federal funds recipient constitutes “deliberate indifference” that 
would qualify as intentional discrimination in violation of Section 601 of Title 
VI.  Sandoval also did not address what conduct amounted to intentional 
discrimination or even how a plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination.231  
Guidance to answering these questions may be garnered from the Supreme 
Courts sexual harassment Title IX cases. 
4.   “Deliberate Indifference” Standard for Sexual Harassment Claims Under 
Title IX 
To turn a blind eye to conduct or policies of an institution that receives 
federal funds and is known to deny participation opportunities Title IX was 
enacted to ensure constitutes intentional discrimination and entitles victims to a 
private cause of action against such institutions.232  This approach to evaluating 
intentional discrimination, a standard that is more flexible than the Supreme 
Court’s traditional intentional discrimination analysis under both Title VI and 
Title IX, emerges upon a closer examination of the Supreme Court’s sexual 
harassment cases, beginning with the Gebser line of cases.233  Title IX not only 
imposes an obligation to prevent discrimination motivated by intent to 
disadvantage or to benefit a particular racial or gender group, it also prohibits 
discrimination that results from conduct or policies that demonstrate disregard 
for the effect of institutional policies or individual conduct on groups protected 
by Title IX, where the disregarder knows of the effects of its conduct or policies, 
has the authority to remedy the discriminatory effects, and chooses not to, or 
fails to make any reasonable effort to remedy.234 
 
 
230. See id. at 292–93. 
231. Black, supra note 125, at 372. 
232. Id. at 380. 
233. Id. at 380–81. 
234. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).  The Court indicated that 
the response of a federal funds recipient determines whether it will be liable for damages under Title 
IX (“We think, moreover, that the response must amount to deliberate indifference to discrimination.  
The administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that an official who is advised of a Title IX 
violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance.  The premise, in other words, is 
an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation.”).  Id. 
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i.   Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District involved a sexual 
harassment claim filed against the Lago Vista Independent School District and 
the sexual harasser.235  The sexual harassment initially began as inappropriate 
and aggressive sexual comments made by Frank Waldrop, a high school teacher, 
to students in his classes.236  It escalated to Waldrop inappropriately touching 
and fondling one student, Alida Star Gebser, during her freshman year in high 
school.237  Waldrop began having sexual intercourse with Ms. Gebser during 
the spring of her freshman year and into January of her sophomore year, when 
Waldrop was arrested after he was discovered having sexual intercourse with 
Ms. Gebser.238  Although parents of two other students complained to the school 
principal of Waldrop’s sexual comments,239 a complaint was never lodged 
regarding Waldrop’s behavior toward, and sexual involvement with, Ms. 
Gebser.240  Waldrop’s employment was terminated and his teaching license 
revoked after his arrest.241 
Ms. Gebser and her mother filed suit in state court alleging, among other 
things, that the school district was liable under Title IX for Waldrop’s 
conduct.242  The Federal District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the 
school district243 was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
 
235. Id. at 277–79. 
236. Id. at 277. 
237. Id. at 277–78. 
238. Id. at 278. 
239. Id. (“The principal arranged a meeting, at which, according to the principal, Waldrop 
indicated that he did not believe he had made offensive remarks but apologized to the parents and said 
it would not happen again.  The principal also advised Waldrop to be careful about his classroom 
comments and told the school guidance counselor about the meeting, but he did not report the parents’ 
complaint to Lago Vista’s superintendent, who was the district’s Title IX coordinator.”). 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 279 (The case was initially filled in state court and later removed to the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Texas.  The District Court granted Lago Vista summary 
judgment on all claims.  The case against Waldrop was remanded to state court.  Gebser appealed the 
summary judgment rejecting her Title IX claim.). 
243. Id.  (The District Court “reasoned that the statute ‘was enacted to counter policies of 
discrimination . . . in federally funded education programs,’ and that ‘[o]nly if school administrators 
have some type of notice of the gender discrimination and fail to respond in good faith can the 
discrimination be interpreted as a policy of the school district.’  Here, the court determined, the parents’ 
complaint to the principal concerning Waldrop’s comments in class was the only one Lago Vista had 
received about Waldrop, and that evidence was inadequate to raise a genuine issue on whether the 
school district had actual or constructive notice that Waldrop was involved in a sexual relationship with 
a student.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
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Circuit.244  The Fifth Circuit determined that the school district could not be 
held liable under Title IX for sexual harassment of a student by one of its 
teachers unless: first, the school district’s employee that was invested with 
supervisory control over the teacher actually knew of the sexual harassment; 
second, the employee with supervisory control must have the power or authority 
to end the abuse; and finally, the employee must have failed to end the sexual 
harassment.245 
The Supreme Court reached its ruling in Gebser—that a damage remedy 
under Title IX is unavailable unless an official of the federal funds recipient that 
has authority to both deal with the alleged discrimination and to implement 
remedial procedures has actual knowledge that its programs are discriminatory 
and also neglects to reasonably respond246—by demonstrating that its ruling 
was mandated by Congressional intent and by limitations placed on damages 
awards where judicially implied private right of action is fashioned by the 
courts.247  The plaintiff in Gebser advanced two possible standards for imposing 
liability on the Lago Vista Independent School District for the teacher’s sexual 
harassment. The first, respondeat superior, where liability would be imposed 
because the teacher’s authority as an employee of the school district facilitated 
the sexual harassment of the student.248  Secondly, liability should be imposed 
because the school district had constructive notice, in that is, the school “district 
knew or ‘should have known’ about harassment but failed to uncover and 
 
244. Id. at 279–80.  (“The court first declined to impose strict liability on school districts for a 
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student, reiterating its conclusion in Leija that strict liability is 
inconsistent with ‘the Title IX contract.’  The court then determined that Lago Vista could not be liable 
on the basis of constructive notice, finding that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that a school 
official should have known about Waldrop’s relationship with Gebser.  Finally, the court refused to 
invoke the common law principle that holds an employer vicariously liable when an employee is ‘aided 
in accomplishing [a] tort by the existence of the agency relation,’ explaining that application of that 
principle would result in school district liability in essentially every case of teacher-student 
harassment.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
245. Id. at 280. 
246. Id. at 290 (“[W]e hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official 
who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective 
measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs 
and fails adequately to respond.”). 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 281–82.  The plaintiff, who was joined by the United States as amicus curiae, would 
impose Title IX liability on the school district because the teacher’s authority as an employee of the 
federal funds recipient aided the teacher’s ability to carry out his sexual harassment of the student 
regardless of whether school district “had any knowledge of the harassment and irrespective of their 
response upon becoming aware.”  Id. at 281.  This position, according to the Supreme Court is “an 
expression of respondeat superior liability, i.e., vicarious or imputed liability, under which recovery in 
damages against a school district would generally follow whenever a teacher’s authority over a student 
facilitates the harassment.”  Id. at 282 (citations omitted). 
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eliminate it.”249 
In rejecting application of the respondeat superior theory to sexual 
harassment of a student by a school teacher, the Supreme Court noted that the 
plaintiff mistakenly relied on a statement in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools250 to argue that vicarious liability theory, which is generally applied in 
employment discrimination cases under Title VII, may be similarly applied to 
Title IX claims where the victim of sexual harassment is a student who is not in 
an employment relationship with the federal funds recipient.251  The Supreme 
Court noted that its decision to impose liability in Franklin did not turn on 
constructive notice or imputed liability.252  Rather, there was ample evidence 
that the school district in Franklin knew of the sexual harassment but did 
nothing about it.253  The Court’s justification for deciding that agency principles 
should direct its inquiry concerning imposition of liability under Title VII rested 
on the proposition that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination and 
defines the term employer to include any agent.254  Title IX, on the other hand, 
does not contain an analogous statement, nor does the statute “expressly call for 
application of agency principles.”255 
Title IX prohibits application of vicarious liability since, unlike Title VII 
where Congress specifically provided for a private right of action,256 the private 
 
249. Id. 
250. 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (“Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public 
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and ‘when a supervisor sexually harasses a 
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor “discriminate[s]” on the basis of sex.’  We 
believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.” (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, (1986)). 
251. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283 (According to the Court, “[w]hether educational institutions can be 
said to violate Title IX based solely on principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice was not 
resolved by Franklin’s citation of Meritor.  That reference to Meritor was made with regard to the 
general proposition that sexual harassment can constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under Title 
IX, an issue not in dispute here.” (citation omitted)). 
252. Id. 
253. Id. (“In fact, the school district’s liability in Franklin did not necessarily turn on principles of 
imputed liability or constructive notice, as there was evidence that school officials knew about the 
harassment but took no action to stop it.”). 
254. Id. at 283. 
255. Id.  The Court noted, 
Moreover, Meritor’s rationale for concluding that agency principles guide the liability inquiry under Title 
VII rests on an aspect of that statute not found in Title IX: Title VII, in which the prohibition against 
employment discrimination runs against ‘an employer’ explicitly defines ‘employer’ to include ‘any agent.’ 
Title IX contains no comparable reference to an educational institution’s ‘agents,’ and so does not expressly 
call for application of agency principles. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
256. Id. (“Unlike Title IX, Title VII contains an express cause of action and specifically provides 
for relief in the form of monetary damages.  Congress therefore has directly addressed the subject of 
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right of action under Title IX is judicially implied.257  In fashioning the scope 
of the private right of action under Title IX and the scope of the corresponding 
damage remedy, the Gebser Court concluded that the purpose of Title IX would 
be frustrated if damage recovery against the school district is allowed to proceed 
on the basis of respondent superior or constructive notice theory.258  A 
requirement that actual notice be received as a condition to recovery would not 
frustrate Title IX’s two fold purposes of preventing federal funds from being 
used to sustain sexual discrimination and affording citizens effectual safeguards 
against discriminatory practices.259 
Conditioning the imposition of liability on actual notice of discrimination 
and on federal recipient’s failure to take corrective action is consistent with the 
contractual relationship between the government and the federal funds recipient 
under Title IX260 and distinguishes recipients’ obligations under Title IX from 
those under Title VII,261 where the prohibition is not conditional.262  
Administrative enforcement of Title IX is also conditioned on actual knowledge 
of discrimination in and by institutions receiving federal education funds.263  
 
damages relief under Title VII and has set out the particular situations in which damages are available 
as well as the maximum amounts recoverable.” (citations omitted)). 
257. Id. at 283–84 (“With respect to Title IX, however, the private right of action is judicially 
implied, and there is thus no legislative expression of the scope of available remedies, including when 
it is appropriate to award monetary damages.” (citations omitted)). 
258. Id. at 285 (“[W]e conclude it would ‘frustrate the purposes’ of Title IX to permit a damages 
recovery against a school district for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student based on principles of 
respondent superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a school district official.  
Because Congress did not expressly create a private right of action under Title IX, the statutory text 
does not shed light on Congress’ intent with respect to the scope of available remedies.”). 
259. Id. at 286 (“Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 with two principal objectives in mind: ‘[T]o 
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ‘to provide individual 
citizens effective protection against those practices.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. 
of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979))). 
260. Id. at 286 (Noting the similarity between Title VI and Title IX, the Gebser Court noted that 
“[t]he two statutes operate in the same manner, conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise 
by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the Government 
and the recipient of funds.”). 
261. Id. (“That contractual framework distinguishes Title IX from Title VII, which is framed in 
terms not of a condition but of an outright prohibition.  Title VII applies to all employers without regard 
to federal funding and aims broadly to ‘eradicat[e] discrimination throughout the economy.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254 (1994)). 
262. Id. at 287. 
263. Id. at 288.  The Court reasoned that 
Title IX’s express means of enforcement—by administrative agencies—operates on an assumption of 
actual notice to officials of the funding recipient. . . . Significantly, however, an agency may not initiate 
enforcement proceedings until it ‘has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply 
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.’  The 
administrative regulations implement that obligation, requiring resolution of compliance issues ‘by 
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According to the Court, the principal purpose of the notice requirement is to 
provide recipients opportunity to voluntarily comply before enforcement action 
is taken, and to avoid education funds from being diverted from educationally 
useful purposes, “where a recipient was unaware of discrimination in its 
programs and is willing to institute prompt corrective measures.”264  It would, 
therefore, be unsound for judicially implied private right of action to permit 
liability and a damages award without requiring notice to, and opportunity to, 
remedy discrimination where the statute’s enforcement structure requires such 
notice.265 
ii.   Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education266 
Aurelia Davis filed an action against the Monroe County Board of 
Education, claiming that her daughter, LaShonda—a fifth grade student—had 
experienced prolonged sexual harassment at the hands of a student in her 
class.267  The harassment began in December of 1992268 and continued beyond 
April of 1993.269  The sexually harassing behavior escalated.270  LaShonda was 
 
informal means whenever possible,’ and prohibiting commencement of enforcement proceedings until the 
agency has determined that voluntary compliance is unobtainable and “the recipient . . . has been notified 
of its failure to comply and of the action to be taken to effect compliance.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
264. Id. at 289. 
265. Id. at 289–90. 
266. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
267. Id. at 632. 
268. Id. at 633–34.  In December of 1992, LaShonda’s classmate, G.F., tried to touch her breasts 
and genital area and also made sexually offensive remarks to her.  Id. at 633.  Similar incidents occurred 
around January 4 and January 20, 1993.  Id.  Each incident was reported to LaShonda’s mother, Aurelia, 
and her teacher, Diane Fort.  Id. at 633–34.   Although Aurelia was assured that the school principal 
was informed, G.F. was not disciplined by the school for his conduct.  Id. at 634. 
269. Id.  According to the record, during a physical education class in February of 1993, G.F., after 
allegedly placing a door stop in his pants, engaged in sexually suggestive behavior toward LaShonda.  
Id.  A week after reporting this incident to her physical education teacher, another incident occurred 
while in the classroom of another teacher, Joyce Pippin.  Id.  These incidents were reported, but with 
no result.  Id. 
270. Id.  The Court reported, 
  Petitioner alleges that G.F. once more directed sexually harassing conduct toward LaShonda in 
physical education class in early March, and that LaShonda reported the incident to both Maples and 
Pippen.  In mid-April 1993, G.F. allegedly rubbed his body against LaShonda in the school hallway in what 
LaShonda considered a sexually suggestive manner, and LaShonda again reported the matter to Fort. 
  The string of incidents finally ended in mid-May, when G.F. was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, 
sexual battery for his misconduct.  The complaint alleges that LaShonda had suffered during the months of 
harassment, however; specifically, her previously high grades allegedly dropped as she became unable to 
concentrate on her studies, and, in April 1993, her father discovered that she had written a suicide note.  
The complaint further alleges that, at one point, LaShonda told petitioner that she “didn't know how much 
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not the only victim of the sexual harassment.271  Not only was very little done 
to prevent or punish the offending student, but LaShonda was also not allowed 
to move her seat in the class; she was sitting next to the offending student for 
more than three months after the harassment began.272 
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to determine whether an 
institution that receives federal educational funds will be held liable, under any 
set of circumstances, for student-on-student sexual harassment.273  According 
to the Court, it was asked to do more than determine the conduct prescribed by 
Title IX.274  The critical question was whether the school district could be held 
liable for its failure to respond to sexual harassment being perpetrated by one 
student against other students.275  Citing its decision in Cannon, the Court 
confirmed that it had previously determined that an implied private right of 
action is available under Title IX,276 and that money damages are recoverable 
for its violation.277  The Court observed that it has regarded Title IX as a law 
having been enacted under authority granted to Congress by the Spending 
Clause of the Constitution.278  Therefore, private damages are only available for 
violations of this implied private right of action when recipients of federal 
educational funds have notice that they could be liable for the behavior in 
question.279 
 
longer she could keep [G.F.] off her.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
271. Id. at 635 (“Nor was LaShonda G. F.’s only victim; it is alleged that other girls in the class 
fell prey to G.F.’s conduct.  At one point, in fact, a group composed of LaShonda and other female 
students tried to speak with Principal Querry about G. F.’s behavior.  According to the complaint, 
however, a teacher denied the students’ request with the statement, ‘If [Querry] wants you, he’ll call 
you.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
272. Id. (“Nor, according to the complaint, was any effort made to separate G. F. and LaShonda.  
On the contrary, notwithstanding LaShonda’s frequent complaints, only after more than three months 
of reported harassment was she even permitted to change her classroom seat so that she was no longer 
seated next to G. F.” (citations omitted)). 
273. Id. at 639. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. (“Here, however, we are asked to do more than define the scope of the behavior that Title 
IX proscribes.  We must determine whether a district’s failure to respond to student-on-student 
harassment in its schools can support a private suit for money damages.”). 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 640; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
279. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.  According to the Supreme Court, 
When Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, it generates legislation “much in the nature of a 
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”  In 
interpreting language in spending legislation, we thus “insis[t] that Congress speak with a clear voice,” 
recognizing that “[t]here can, of course, be no knowing acceptance [of the terms of the putative contract] if 
a State is unaware of the conditions [imposed by the legislation] or is unable to ascertain what is expected 
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The Supreme Court rejected the school district’s argument that the liability 
sought to be imposed on the district was for conduct of a third party and not for 
its own behavior.280  In rejecting the district’s argument, the Court determined 
the conduct for which the district would be held liable was its decision to remain 
idle—turning a blind eye—in the face of student on student sexual harassment 
in its program.281  The Court made a distinction between the notice limitations 
imposed on the federal funds recipient as to the scope of potential activities that 
may be prohibited by Title IX282 and whether the recipient had notice that the 
prohibited conduct is being carried under its programs.283 
When an institution accepts federal educational funds, the contract entered 
into with the government is an agreement to abide by congressionally imposed 
conditions established when Congress acted under the Spending Clause of the 
Constitution.284  Congress may act pursuant to its authority under the Spending 
 
of it.” 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
280. Id. at 640–41  (The Court agreed that Title IX imposes liability for the conduct of the federal 
funds recipient that “‘[E]xclud[e] [persons] from participation in, . . . den[y] [persons] the benefits of, 
or . . . subjec[t] [persons] to discrimination under’ its ‘program[s] or activit[ies]’ in order to be liable 
under Title IX.  The Government’s enforcement power may only be exercised against the funding 
recipient, and we have not extended damages liability under Title IX to parties outside the scope of this 
power.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
281. Id. at 641–42. 
282. Id. (“We recognized that the scope of liability in private damages actions under Title IX is 
circumscribed by Pennhurst’s requirement that funding recipients have notice of their potential 
liability.  Invoking Pennhurst, Guardians Ass’n, and Franklin, in Gebser we once again required ‘that 
the “receiving entity of federal funds [have] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award”’ before 
subjecting it to damages liability.” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). 
283. The Court noted that the limitation recognized by Pennhurst and its progeny, although 
protecting the federal funds recipient from vicarious liability for actions of its employees or agents on 
a negligence theory, the limitation does not insulate the federal funds recipient from liability for its own 
intentional discrimination in violation of Title IX.  The Court reasoned that, 
In particular, we concluded that Pennhurst does not bar a private damages action under Title IX where the 
funding recipient engages in intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the statute. 
  Accordingly, we rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability to the district for the 
misconduct of its teachers.  Likewise, we declined the invitation to impose liability under what amounted 
to a negligence standard—holding the district liable for its failure to react to teacher-student harassment of 
which it knew or should have known.  Rather, we concluded that the district could be liable for damages 
only where the district itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately 
indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge.  Contrary to the dissent’s 
suggestion, the misconduct of the teacher in Gebser was not “treated as the grant recipient’s actions.”  
Liability arose, rather, from “an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation.” 
Id. at 642 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 
U.S. 274, 290 (1998). 
284. The Spending Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the U S. Constitutions provides: “The Congress 
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises 
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Clause only when recipients of federal funds voluntarily and knowingly accept 
the conditions and terms of the assumed contract with the government.285  
Further, as the Court acknowledged in Davis, there can be no knowing 
acceptance unless federal funds recipients are aware of the conditions imposed 
by Congress or are able to determine what is expected of them.286  In the case 
of Title IX, recipients of federal educational funds must have notice from the 
statute that Congress prohibits certain behavior.  Notice of the scope of conduct 
Title IX was enacted to proscribe may be found in the express terms of the 
statute, its statutory structure, and the nature of the enforcement powers granted 
federal agencies to insure compliance.287 
The Supreme Court rejected the school district’s argument in Davis that 
student-on-student sexual harassment is not a form of discrimination that falls 
within the scope of Title IX, because discrimination of third parties is not 
discrimination committed by the school district.288  In doing so, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the school district was on notice that it could be obligated to 
prevent discrimination perpetrated by third parties, in this case a student.289  
Notice to the district was provided by the statute and the enforcement agencies 
that the district has an affirmative obligation to prevent sexual discrimination 
by third parties over which it has authority and control.290 
Having determined that the school district was on notice that it could be 
potentially liable for student-on-student sexual harassment, the Supreme Court 
identified a second form of notice federal funds recipients must have before they 
may be held liable, which notice relates to the elements of the judicially implied 
right of action under Title IX.  To be liable for damages, the federal funds 
recipient must have knowledge that beneficiaries of its educational programs 
are being discriminated against under circumstances where the district has 
authority to act and fails to act by remaining deliberately indifferent to the plight 
 
shall be uniform throughout the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
285. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“The legitimacy of 
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and 
knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”). 
286. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640. 
287. Id. at 638–39, 644. 
288. Id. at 642. 
289. Id. at 643–44.  According to the Court, 
[T]he regulatory scheme surrounding Title IX has long provided funding recipients with notice that 
they may be liable for their failure to respond to the discriminatory acts of certain nonagents.  The 
Department of Education requires recipients to monitor third parties for discrimination in specified 
circumstances and to refrain from particular forms of interaction with outside entities that are known 
to discriminate. 
Id. 
290. See id. at 645, 647–48. 
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the class of persons Title IX was enacted to benefit.  The intentional 
discrimination for which the federal funds recipient will be held liable for is 
their deliberate indifference to discrimination against a class of beneficiaries of 
Title IX.291  Deliberate indifference to discriminatory conduct by third parties 
that prevents students enrolled in the district programs from gaining equal 
access to educational services is a form of intentional discrimination that falls 
within Title IX’s scope.292 
5.   Deliberate Indifference to the Lack of Equal Access to Sports 
Opportunities for Protected Groups Constitutes Actionable Discrimination 
Under Title IX 
The argument made in this section is that the failure to effectively 
accommodate the interest of or to provide sports participation opportunities for 
African-American girls, girls from other minority groups, or girls from urban, 
rural, and economically disadvantaged communities—although traceable to 
race, cultural, or economic factors—constitutes intentional discrimination in 
violation of Title IX.  Deliberate indifference to the lack of effective 
accommodation and participation opportunities available to these girls, 
regardless of its origin, is a form of intentional discrimination under Title IX. 
Educational institutions that receive federal educational funds intentionally 
discriminate in violation of Title IX when these institutions are deliberately 
indifferent to gender inequity experienced by girls that are members of these 
identity groups.293  The fact that racial discrimination, which may have been 
caused by another entity—and for which that entity may be liable—does not 
 
291. Id. at 642 (“Rather, we concluded that the district could be liable for damages only where the 
district itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to 
acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge.” (emphasis added)). 
292. Id. at 650.  According to the Court, 
The statute makes clear that, whatever else it prohibits, students must not be denied access to educational 
benefits and opportunities on the basis of gender.  We thus conclude that funding recipients are properly 
held liable in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they 
have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive 
the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. 
Id. 
293. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998); see also Black, supra note 
125, at 371 (“The Gebser line of cases demonstrates that a defendant also violates Title VI and Title IX 
when it takes intentional action/inaction that causes, contributes to, or perpetuates the discrimination 
or disadvantages that occur within its programs.” (emphasis added)).  The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied the “deliberate indifference” doctrine under Title VI in Zeno v. Pine Planes Central 
School District, 702 F.3rd 655, 671 (2nd Cir. 2012) to “conclude that there was sufficient evidence in 
the record to support the jury’s finding that the District’s responses to student harassment of Anthony 
‘‘amount[ed] to deliberate indifference to discrimination.” 
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absolve the recipient of federal educational funds of its obligation to address the 
resultant gender inequity caused thereby.294 
i.   Educational Institutions Failure to Provide Interscholastic Participation 
Opportunities for Girls, Regardless of Race or Economic Status, Is Within 
the Scope of Discriminatory Practices Title IX Was Intended to Reach 
The Supreme Court has already determined that an implied private right of 
action is available under Title XI, and that money damages are recoverable for 
its violation.295  Private damages are only available for violations of Title IX 
when recipients of federal educational funds have notice that the offending 
conduct falls within the scope of statute.296  Title IX is applicable to educational 
institutions, which includes secondary schools.297  The regulations 
implementing Title IX specifically provide that a “recipient which operates or 
sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall 
provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.”298  Clearly 
educational institutions that receive federal educations funds are aware of the 
conditions Title IX attaches to those funds (i.e. that recipients of those funds 
must afford equal access to members of both sexes to athletic opportunities, 
including African-Americans and girls from other minority groups, girls from 
urban communities, and girls from economically disadvantaged 
communities.299 
ii.   Private Cause of Action Requires Notice to Offending Institutions that 
Beneficiaries of Title IX the Lack of Equal Access to Athletic 
Opportunities 
Once it is clear that recipients of federal educational funds have notice that 
they could fall within the ambit of Title IX and potentially exposed for their 
failure to provide equal access to athletic participation opportunities for girls, 
 
294. Black, supra note 125, at 371 (“Such a violation occurs, even when the defendant did not 
initially desire or act to create discrimination or disadvantage, if the discrimination and disadvantage 
continue to occur because the defendant knowingly refuses or fails to intervene.”). 
295. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640. 
296. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283–84. 
297. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (“For purposes of this chapter an educational institution means any 
public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, 
professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educational institution composed of more 
than one school, college, or department which are administratively separate units, such term means 
each such school, college, or department. . . .”). 
298. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2012). 
299. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286. 
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regardless of their race, ethnic background, or community of origin, Title IX 
further requires notice that girls within programs are not actually being afforded 
equal access to athletic participation opportunities. 
According to the Supreme Court in Gebser, the principal purpose of actual 
notice is to provide recipients an opportunity to voluntarily comply before 
enforcement action is taken.  Notice also avoids educational funds from being 
diverted from educationally useful purposes, as “where a recipient was unaware 
of discrimination in its programs and is willing to institute prompt corrective 
measures.”300  The Court concluded that it would therefore be unsound for a 
judicially implied private right of action to permit liability and damages award 
without requiring notice to and opportunity to remedy discrimination, where the 
statute’s enforcement structure requires such notice.301 
The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has said that 
an institution violates Title IX if it fails to meet any of the three elements of the 
“three prong test.”302  The “three prong test” was derived by the OCR in its 1979 
Policy Interpretation and provided three benchmarks for demonstrating 
effective accommodation claims under Title IX.303  Under the “three prong 
test,” a federal funds recipient had to establish either that: 1) the educational 
institution is providing athletic participation opportunities to members of each 
sex in numbers that are substantially proportionate to their respective enrollment 
at that institution; 2) the institution has demonstrated a history of 
accommodating the athletic interests of the underrepresented sex; or 3) that the 
athletic interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex has been effectively 
accommodated.304 
 
300. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289.  See discussion supra Parts IV(A)(4)(i) (indicating that imposing 
liability under a respondent superior theory would allow education funds to be diverted from 
educationally useful purposes). 
301. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
302. See Andrew J. Weissler, Unasked Questions: Applying Title IX’s Effective Accommodation 
Mandate to Interscholastic Athletics, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 71, 80–81 (2012). 
303. Id. In 1975, the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) listed 
ten (10) nonexclusive factors courts should consider in determining whether an educational institution 
is in compliance with Title IX, the first of which was “[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of 
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes.”  Id. at 79.  
Claims filed under this first factor were later referred to as “effective accommodation” claims.  Id.  The 
other nine factors were referred to as “equal treatment” claims.  Id.  The “three prong test” came out of 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 1979 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 
71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979), and provided three benchmarks for demonstrating effective accommodation 
claims.  Id. at 80–81. 
304. Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward 
Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. &  POL’Y 51, 62 (1996) (“Under the 
first prong, the court examines whether athletic participation opportunities are provided to each sex in 
numbers substantially proportionate to their enrollment.  If a school cannot meet this prong, the court 
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Title IX and its implementing regulations apply to interscholastic athletics. 
Scholars, however, have taken three different views in applying the “three prong 
test” to determine whether educational institutions have effectively 
accommodated the interest of both sexes in the context of interscholastic 
athletics.305 
One approach is to apply the tests to interscholastic athletics exactly as the 
courts have applied in the intercollegiate context.306  Other commentators take 
the position that the “three prong test,” considering the impact of its application 
to intercollegiate athletics, is appropriate and should not be applied to 
interscholastic athletics.307  Finally, some scholars, while recognizing that 
interscholastic athletics is a legitimate gender discrimination subject, remedying 
discriminatory impacts in interscholastic institutions pose such unique problems 
strict application of the three prong test is simply unworkable.  These scholars 
are nevertheless willing to propose alternative solutions even if they are 
inconsistent with the statutory framework of Title IX.308 
This Article does not advocate adoption of these approaches, nor does it 
advance a fourth alternative.  It does not attempt to reconcile them either.  
Instead, the author takes the position that regardless of the agency’s articulated 
 
then determines whether the school can demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion for the underrepresented sex.  If a school fails the second prong, the court finally asks 
whether the athletic interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex have been fully and effectively 
accommodated by the school.  If the plaintiffs can show that the school also fails on this third prong, 
then the court must find the school out of compliance with Title IX.  In applying this three-prong test, 
courts have arrived at the same conclusion: that the schools that have been challenged to date have 
failed to provide adequate opportunity to their female athletes and thereby are violating federal law.”). 
305. Weissler, supra note 304, at 73–74 (noting that although “the guidance developed for 
intercollegiate athletics is meant to apply to interscholastic athletics only ‘when appropriate,’ and no 
further guidance has been provided for when such appropriateness exists,” the “when appropriate” 
language has been ignored by courts when applying the Policy Interpretations to interscholastic 
athletics).  Not only have courts ignored the differences between the maturity and skill level of 
intercollegiate athletes and interscholastic athletes in applying the three prong test, so have scholars.  
Id. at 74. 
306. Id. at 74 (citing Ray Yasser & Samuel J. Schiller, Gender Equity in Athletics: The New 
Battleground of Interscholastic Sports, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 371 (1997); Lynne Tatum, 
Comment, Girls in Sports: Love of the Game Must Begin at an Early Age to Achieve Equality, 12 SETON 
HALL J. SPORT L. 281 (2002)). 
307. Id. (citing Allison Kasic, Title IX Enforcement Could Devastate High School Sports, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/02/16/title-ix-
enforcement-could-devastate-high-school-sports; Letter from Joshua P. Thompson, Attorney, Pac. 
Legal Found., To Whom It May Concern, Office for Civil Rights, Chi. Office, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 
(Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/document.doc?id=514). 
308. Id. (citing Patrick N. Findlay, The Case for Requiring a Proportionality Test to Assess 
Compliance with Title IX in High School Athletics, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 29, 36-40 (2002); Carolyn 
Davis, Note, Leave It on the Field: Too Expansive an Approach to Evaluating Title IX Compliance in 
Biediger v. Quinnipiac University?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 265, 272-73 (2010)). 
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rationale for application of Title IX’s proscriptions and remedies applicable to 
intercollegiate athletics, turning a blind eye to gender based inequities 
experienced by girls at the interscholastic level who are members of certain 
identify groups—namely African-Americans, Hispanic and Asian girls, and 
girls from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities—
constitutes intentional discrimination under the Supreme Court’s deliberate 
indifference jurisprudence under Title IX. 
In the author’s view, any federal funds recipient, at any level of athletics, 
should be held liable if it can be established that such institutions are 
deliberately indifferent to discrimination against a protected class of Title IX 
beneficiaries, after notice of its existence, and they act to perpetuate such 
discrimination.309  Using this more elemental approach, the next question is 
exactly what forms of institutional conduct should constitute the kind of 
deliberate indifference so as to trigger Title IX liability for interscholastic 
institutions? 
iii.   Notice that Girls Are Not Being Afforded Equal Access to Athletic 
Participation Opportunities Must Be Given to Someone With Authority to 
Prevent the Discrimination 
The Supreme Court ruled in Gebser that a damage remedy under Title IX is 
unavailable unless an official of the federal funds recipient that has authority to 
both deal with the alleged discrimination and to implement remedial procedures 
has actual knowledge that its programs are discriminatory and also neglects to 
reasonably respond.310  The Supreme Court in Gebser recognized that the 
school principal was such a person.  The plaintiff in Gebser correctly identified 
the school principal as the person that has authority to address the alleged 
discrimination and to implement remedial procedures, however, the plaintiff 
failed on providing such notice.  Rather than notifying the principal that the 
student was being sexually harassed by the teacher, parents complained that the 
teacher made sexually inappropriate remarks during class.311 
 
309. Black, supra note 125, at 379 (“The Gebser line of cases demonstrates that the statutory bar 
of discrimination in federally funded programs—which the Court has interpreted to mean “intentional” 
discrimination—also prohibits volitional actions that effectively perpetuate discrimination, undermine 
congressional intent, or subject individuals to inequality.”). 
310. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). 
311. Id. at 291.  According to the Gebser Court, 
The only official alleged to have had information about Waldrop’s misconduct is the high school principal.  
That information, however, consisted of a complaint from parents of other students charging only that 
Waldrop had made inappropriate comments during class, which was plainly insufficient to alert the 
principal to the possibility that Waldrop was involved in a sexual relationship with a student. 
Id. 
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Moreover, there are a number of other parties within educational institutions 
that receive federal funds that would satisfy the requirement that notice must be 
given to an official of the federal funds recipient that has authority to both deal 
with the alleged discrimination and to implement remedial procedures.  At the 
interscholastic level, “official notice” may be provided to school administrators, 
School District Boards of Directors, Superintendents, Athletic Director, 
teachers, or even other coaches.  Such notice can be implied from the statistical 
evidence that is readily available through a variety of governmental agencies.  
The statistics in this Article clearly demonstrate a lack of access to sports 
opportunities for African-American girls and girls from other minority groups, 
girls from urban and girls from economically disadvantaged communities 
currently exists in institutions offering interscholastic athletics.  Determining 
whether these statistics are also true with respect to particular federal 
educational funds recipients offering interscholastic athletics is the first step.  
Providing official notice to institutional administrators that the Title IX rights 
of African-American girls and girls from other minority groups, girls from 
urban communities, and girls from economically disadvantaged communities 
are being violated is the next step.  With the notice and opportunity to cure issue 
resolved, access to statutory remedies can readily be pursued to bring these 
identity groups within the orbit of statutory protections Title IX was created to 
promote. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Interscholastic educational institutions may be held liable for their failure 
to achieve gender equity for minority female students and gender equity for 
females from urban, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities.  
Gender equity, with respect to access to participation opportunities in emerging 
women’s sports, must be achieved in middle and high school athletic programs, 
if gender equity is to be achieved at the collegiate level for girls from these 
identity groups. Participation opportunities in NCAA designated emerging 
sports (volleyball, lacrosse, soccer, crew, water polo, and equestrian) must 
realistically be available to middle school and high schools girls in urban, rural, 
minority, and economically disadvantaged communities.  Unfortunately for 
girls from these communities, participation opportunities are only available in 
traditional women’s sports: basketball and track and field.  Unless middle 
school and high schools girls in urban, rural, and minority communities are 
given the opportunities to participate in the emerging women’s sports, the fact 
is that gender equity is being (facially) achieved only because Title IX 
requirements are implemented without specific regard to detrimental impacts 
failure to remedy lack of participation opportunities for those subgroups. 
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Under Title IX there are two categories of intentional discrimination that 
are both actionable under Title IX.  The first is direct discrimination by a 
perpetrator of the discrimination; the person that directly discriminates against 
victims. The second intentional discrimination category is not the perpetrator or 
the party causing the discrimination, but the party who knows or learns of the 
discrimination, has the authority to take corrective action, but fails to take such 
action. 
The first category of discriminatory conduct is actionable as traditional 
intentional discrimination where the perpetrator liability is imposed because the 
perpetrator’s conduct is motivated by a discriminatory purpose.  The second 
category is more nuanced.  The discriminatory actor in this case is not the direct 
actor.  In fact, the violator may have no motive to discriminate at all, or the 
discrimination experienced by the victim may have been unintentional. The 
violator in this case learns of the discriminatory effect and turns a blind eye to 
injury.  More accurately, the violator is indifferent to the discriminatory effects 
of the conduct of the intentional discriminator or the discriminatory effects of it 
policies or programs.  It is my contention that this second form of intentional 
discrimination, “deliberate indifference,” is actionable intentional 
discrimination under Title IX. 
A school district may be liable for this second form of intentional 
discrimination where, for example, its athletic resource allocation decisions 
provide athletic participation opportunities for majority and economically 
advantaged female students without regard to the interests of other female 
subgroups.  Such a school district may not be motivated by discriminatory 
animus, but what happens when its administrators learn that their actions have 
worked an unintended discriminatory effect on distinctly identifiable subgroups 
of female students protected under Title IX?  However, when a school district, 
rather than ameliorating the known discriminatory effects of its resource 
allocation decision-making on protected subgroups under Title IX, simply 
ignores the discriminatory effect of its decisions, it has violated the law. 
To be certain, the school district’s original “remedial” allocation decision-
making will not, standing alone, breach the Supreme Court’s traditional 
intentional discrimination standard.  However, the intentional act which will 
result in liability is the “deliberate indifference” to the effects of that decision-
making on protected subgroups.  The doctrine holds that it is the decision not to 
ameliorate the unintended consequences of its original decision to allocate 
resources that is the wrongful act. 
